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SUMMARY 
This research addresses the issue of the appearance of independence of the judges of 
the Court of Justice regarding the manner of their selection. It highlights the lack of interest 
of the literature in this issue despite its importance and it suggests that the selection procedure 
established by art. 255 TFEU weakens the appearance of independence of the judges of the 
Court of Justice. According to this procedure, national governments submit a candidate to the 
“255 Committee”, which gives a non-binding opinion on his or her suitability. Afterwards, 
all Member States decide on the appointment of the candidate at unanimity. With regard to 
the national stage of the selection, the procedure can be different from one Member State to 
another. After analysing these procedures in Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, it 
turns out that the national selection procedures are sometimes very opaque and based on 
subjective criteria. With regard to the European stage of the selection, the powers of the 255 
Committee are limited, although less then they seem to be. In conclusion, this research shows 
that the selection procedure of the judges of the Court of Justice does not affect their 
appearance of independence so that it would lead to a breach of the right to be judged by an 
independent tribunal. However, the manner of this selection weakens their appearance of 
independence. Given how great a role the Court of Justice plays in the European Union, this 
weakening should be a primary concern.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Independence of the judges is a key feature of any democracy.
1
 It is required by two 
democratic values: the separation of powers and the right to justice, the latter embodying the 
duty to render justice. 
In every democracy, the exercise of power is shaped through the separation of powers.
2
 
Since the judiciary ensures that the legislative and the executive respect the rule of law, it has 
to be independent from them. In this regard, the independence of the judges is one of the 
most fundamental aspects of the European Union as a democratic area of “freedom, security 
and justice”.3 
In every democracy, everyone has a right to justice.
4
 To render justice, judges must apply 
the law without being influenced by the other powers.
5
 If there is no independence, there is 
no fair trial,
6
 and if there is no fair trial, there is no justice. Therefore, there can be no right to 
justice without judicial independence. Independence of the judges is then recognized as the 
pillar of any fair trial and as a fundamental right in the European Union through article 6 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights and article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union.  
                                                 
1
 Iacobucci, F. (2007), “Foreword”, in K. Malleson & P. H. Russel (eds.), Appointing Judges in an Age of 
Judicial Power. Critical Perspectives from Around the World (University of Toronto Press), p IX. 
2
 Regarding judicial independence, the concept of separation of powers is absolutely central in the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights. See Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, §78, ECHR, 
2002-IV and Maktouf and Damjanovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, §49, 
ECHR, 2013. I will refer to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights all along this dissertation. This 
is justified by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which States that “in so far as this 
Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down 
by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection” 
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] O.J. C83/02, Art. 52(3)). More specifically, the 
Court of Justice has already referred itself to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding 
judicial independence (Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-08613, §§51, 53 and 57). In particular, in this case, 
the Court of Justice has referred to the following cases: Campbell and Fell, nos. 7819/77 and 7878/77, ECHR, 
1984; De Cubber v. Belgium, no. 9186/80, ECHR, 1984; Langborger v. Sweden, no. 11179/84, ECHR, 1989. 
3
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13, Art. 3§2. 
4
 In particular, “access to justice is a fundamental pillar of western legal culture. ‘To no one will we sell, to no 
one will we deny or delay right or justice’ proclaimed the Magna Carta in 1215, expressing an axiom which has 
remained in force in Europe to the extent that it features in the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the case law of the Court” (C-14/08 Roda Golf & 
Beach Resort [2009] ECR I-05439, opinion of AG Colomer, §29). 
5
 Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-08613, §53. 
6
 Türkmen v. Turkey, no. 43124/98, §62, ECHR, 2006. 
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In every democracy, every judge has the duty to render justice in order to respect 
everyone’s right to justice. Since there is no right to justice without judicial independence, 
independence is “inherent in the mission of judging”.7 In that sense, the Court of Justice does 
not even consider a body as a jurisdiction if this body is not independent.
8
  
For all of these reasons, the concept of judicial independence is fundamental. However, 
this concept is also very broad. It is therefore necessary to approach it from two angles. First, 
what does one mean by judicial independence? Second, how can one determine whether a 
judge is independent?  
With regard to judicial independence, the Court of Justice distinguishes two aspects of 
this concept:
9
 internal and external independence. Internal independence is related to the 
parties. It seeks to ensure that the judge will respect an equal distance to the parties and the 
interests at stake.
10
 In that sense, independence does rather correspond to impartiality.
11
 
External independence entails that “the body is protected against external intervention or 
pressure liable to jeopardise the independent judgment of its members as regards 
proceedings before them”.12 External independence is then evaluated with regard to the other 
institutional powers, especially the executive.
13
 Yet internal and external independence do not 
always refer to different realities: they merge when the State is one of the parties at stake.  
                                                 
7
 Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-08613, §49. 
8
 Case C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-01277, §15; C-393/92 Gemeente Almelo e.a./Energiebedrijf IJsselmij 
[1994] ECR I-01477, §21; Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult Ingenieursgesellschaft/Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin 
[1997] ECR I-04961, §23, Case C-110/98 Gabalfrisa e.a. [2000] ECR 1-01577, §33; Case C-516/99 Schmid 
[2002] ECR I-04573, §34 and 36; Case C-53/03 Syfait e.a. [2005] ECR I-04609, §29; Case C-506/04 Wilson 
[2006] ECR I-08613, §49; Case C-517/09 RTL Belgium [2010] ECR I-14093, §36 and 38-41; Case C-196/09 
Miles e.a [2011] ECR I-05105, §37; Case C-363/11 Epitropos tou Elegktikou Synedriou [2012], §23; Case C-
175/11 D. and A. [2013], §83. See also Oliver, P. (2001), “La recevabilité des questions préjudicielles : la 
jurisprudence des années 1990”, CDE, p. 17. 
9
 Case C-175/11 D. and A. [2013], §96. See also Gilliaux, P. (2012), Droit(s) européen(s) à un procès équitable, 
(Brussels: Bruylant), p. 470. 
10
 Case C-175/11 D. and A. [2013], §96. 
11
 C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-08613, §51. See also Closset-Marchal, G. (2011), “Les guaranties du procès 
équitable en droit judiciaire privé”, J.T., p. 683; Soyer, J.-Cl. and De Salva, M., (1999), “Article 6”, in La 
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme : commentaire article par article (Paris: Economica), p. 260. 
12
 Case C-175/11 D. and A. [2013], §96. 
13
 De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, nos. 2832/66, 2835/66 and 2899/66, ECHR, 1971, §78; Case C-
174/98 Nederlands and Van der Wal v. Commission [2013] ECR I-00001, §17. 
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With regard to the evaluation of judicial independence, both the Court of Justice and the 
European Court of Human Rights have identified a set of criteria.
14
 One can find six criteria 
in their case law: (1) the existence of guarantees against outside pressures; (2) the 
composition of the tribunal
15
; (3) the term of office of the judges; (4) the grounds for 
abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members; (5) the fact that the body appears to be 
independent
16
; (6) and the manner of appointment of the judges. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I will only consider external independence and assess it through the criterion of 
the appearance of independence.  
I submit that the selection procedure of the judges is a determining process regarding 
their appearance of independence.
17
 With regard to the Court of Justice, the relationship 
between appearance of independence and the manner of selection of the judges is expressed 
through art. 19 TEU and 253(1) TFEU, which state that judges of the Court “shall be chosen 
from persons whose independence is beyond doubt”.18 Therefore, it is necessary to analyse 
the selection procedure of the judges of the Court of Justice in order to determine whether it 
ensures its appearance of independence
19
 beyond doubt. 
                                                 
14
 Cooper v. the United Kingdom, no. 48843/99, ECHR, 2003, §104; Case C-175/11 D. and A. [2013], §97. 
15
 According to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the composition of a tribunal clearly 
embodies the issue of the selection of the judges. See for example Savino and others v. Italy, nos. 17214/05, 
20329/05 and 42113/04, ECHR, 2009, §103-104; Taxquet v. Belgium [GC], no. 926/05, ECHR, 2010, §72; 
Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 21722/11, ECHR, 2013, §110-111. 
16
 For the Court of Justice: Case C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-01277; Case C-53/03 Syfait e.a. [2005] ECR I-
04609, §29; Case C-517/09 RTL Belgium [2010] ECR I-14093, §36; Case C-196/09 Miles e.a [2011] ECR I-
05105, §37; Case C-175/11 D. and A. [2013], §83 and §95-97. For the European Court of Human Rights: 
Campbell and Fell, nos. 7819/77 and 7878/77, ECHR, 1984, §78; Langborger v. Sweden, no. 11179/84, ECHR, 
1989, §32; Findlay v. the United Kingdom, no. 22107/93, ECHR, 1997; Cooper v. the United Kingdom, no. 
48843/99, ECHR, 2003, §104; Ergin v. Turkey, no. 47533/99, ECHR, 2006-VI, §38; Miroshnik v. Ukraine, no. 
75804/01, ECHR, 2008, §61; Olujic v. Croatia, no. 22330/05, ECHR, 2009, §38. 
17
 See Malenovski, J. (2011), “L’indépendance des juges internationaux”, Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law, vol. 349, p. 115. 
18
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13, Art. 19; Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] O.J. C 115/47, Art. 253(1). 
19
 Case C-175/11 D. and A. [2013], §99; Findlay v. the United Kingdom, no. 22107/93, ECHR 1997, §73; 
Cooper v. the United Kingdom, no. 48843/99, ECHR, 2003, §104; Zolotas v. Greece, no. 38240/02, ECHR, 
2005, §24; Ergin v. Turkey, no. 47533/99, ECHR, 2006-VI, §38. See also Brisard, S. (2011), “The European 
Court of Justice: Empowered after Lisbon, European Policy Institutes Network”, EPIN Papers, n°31, p. 7. See 
also Consultative Council of European Judges (2001), Opinion no. 1 for the attention of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on standards concerning the independence of the judiciary and the 
irremovability of judges, https://wcd.coe.int, Art. 10-11. 
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Although some research has been carried out into the independence of the Court of 
Justice, the literature does not seem to be interested in the selection procedure of its judges.
20
 
The very rare scholars who showed interest for this issue were not lawyers, but political 
scientists.
21
 Nevertheless, very recently, lawyers slowly began to discuss the selection 
procedure of the judges of the Court of Justice.
22
 Yet, there is still nothing written regarding 
the appearance of independence of these judges, as it is perceived in the light of the manner 
of their selection. In addition, the selection of the candidates at the national level, which 
precedes the appointment of the judges at the European level, is largely ignored or, at least, 
underestimated whereas it plays a primary role in the selection of the judges of the Court of 
Justice. Hence, this dissertation aims to show how appearances are neglected by the current 
selection procedure as well as by the literature despite their importance. In doing so, it is 
based in good part on the selection of the candidates organized at the national level. 
Given the space limitations of this dissertation, a choice had to be made regarding the 
analysed national selection procedures. I choose to analyse these procedures in the United 
Kingdom, France and Belgium for three reasons. First, the procedures established in these 
                                                 
20
 Kelemen, R. D. (2012), “The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in the European Union”, in S. K. 
Schmidt and R. D. Kelemen (eds.), The Power of the European Court of Justice, (Routledge), p. 50. See also 
Sauvé, J.-M., (forthcoming), “La sélection des juges de l’Union européenne : la pratique du comité de l’article 
255” in M. Bobek (ed.), Selecting Europe’s Judges (Oxford University Press), p. 1). For an example of such a 
disinterest, see Guinard, D. “Les éléments d’indépendance et de dépendence de la justice : l’exemple de l’Union 
européenne” in Sedky, J. A., Delmas, G., and Robbe, S. (eds.), L’indépendance de la Justice, (Paris: 
l’Harmattan), p. 132. As to the Court of Justice case law, the independence of the Court has been questioned 
only once and the objection was clumsily expressed, which led the Court to brush it aside. Accordingly, one 
could hardly claim that the Court totally rejects any questioning of its independence on the basis of this case. 
The Court answered as follows: “as to the objection raised by the defendants in the main proceedings that the 
power of review is conferred on the Court of Justice, whose independence they claim is undermined on the 
ground that the Court is itself an EU institution, suffice it to state that it is wholly unfounded in the light of all 
the safeguards laid down in the Treaties, which ensure the independence and impartiality of the Court of Justice, 
and the fact that all judicial bodies necessarily form part of the State or supranational organisation to which 
they belong, a fact which on its own is not capable of entailing an infringement of Article 47 of the Charter or 
Article 6 of the ECHR” (Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis nv and others [2012] §64 – I 
emphasize). Furthermore, since the objection of the defendants was not related to the selection procedure of the 
judges of the Court of Justice, it is not relevant for this dissertation and will not be discussed here. 
21
 Kelemen, R. D. (2012), ibid. See especially the remarkable paper of Kenney, S. J. (1998-1999), “The 
Members of the Court of Justice of the European Communities”, Columbia Journal of European Law, vol. 5, p. 
101-133. Kenney was already making the same observation at the time (ibid., p. 104-105). 
22
 See for example the conference organized by the College of Europe late 2013: Selecting Europe’s Judges: A 
Critical Appraisal of Appointment Processes to the European Courts (https://www.coleurope.eu) and the 
forthcoming book based on it, M. Bobek (ed.), Selecting Europe’s Judges (Oxford University Press). See also 
Ritleng, D. (forthcoming), “The Independence and Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice”, in D. Ritleng 
(ed.), Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the EU, (Oxford University Press). 
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Member States constitute three different models, which provide a contrasted overview of the 
issue. Second, this reason has to be combined with the issue of the access to data. In this 
regard, I choose the analysed Member States depending of my language skills. Third, the 
opacity of some of the national selection procedures makes sometimes extremely difficult the 
collection of collect data on their functioning. As a result, I had to focus on some Member 
State in order to collect these data as efficiently as possible, and to select the Member States 
for which I had the possibility to find these data.  
As for the methodology, with the exception of the United Kingdom, there is no legal or 
official public source establishing or explaining the organization of the selection procedure 
for the candidates to the position of judge at the Court of Justice at the national level in the 
analysed Member States. As a result, the data I use in this dissertation come mainly from 
personal interviews with judges of the Court of Justice, European Union lawyers and 
academics,
23
 and from the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the 
European Union, which has organized its fifth colloquium in Paris on 25 and 26 October 
2012 on the Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and to the European Court of Human Rights. For the purposes of this 
colloquium, every President of the network had to answer to a standard questionnaire on the 
national selection procedure of the judges for these Courts in his Member State. These 
questionnaires include useful information on this issue.
24
 
This dissertation is structured as follows. I will start by establishing a theoretical 
framework, in which I will develop the concept of appearance of independence (I). I will then 
proceed to an empirical analysis of the selection procedure of the judges of the Court of 
Justice at the European level and at the national level in Belgium, France, and the United 
Kingdom (II). Finally, I will evaluate this selection procedure with regard to the theoretical 
framework established in the first part (III). The conclusion suggests that appearances should 
be more taken into account in order to strengthen the independence of the Court of Justice 
and the public confidence towards it. 
 
                                                 
23
 According to these people’s wishes, I keep their identity confidential. 
24
 See appendix.  
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I 
THE CONCEPT OF APPEARANCE OF INDEPENDENCE 
I will start by defining the concept of appearance of independence (1). I will then address 
an important preliminary observation regarding the relationship between appearance and 
reality in order to avoid any misunderstanding of my claim (2). Next, I will explain why 
appearance of independence matters beyond independence itself (3). I will then try to clarify 
the relationship between the appearance of independence and the selection of the judges by 
showing how the latter affects the former (4). This will lead me to address a more normative 
aspect: how should one select the judges in order to ensure their appearance of independence 
(5)? Finally, I will analyse the case law of the Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights to find out how these Courts deal with the concept of appearance of 
independence (6). 
1. What is appearance of independence? 
According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights, appearance of independence can be described as the requirement that obliges a 
judicial body to act in such a way that it “dispel[s] any reasonable doubt in the minds of 
individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with 
respect to the interests before it”.25 
2. The relationship between appearance and reality in the concept of appearance of 
independence 
According to the concept of appearance of independence, a judge is not independent if 
he
26
 does not appear to be independent.
27
 In that sense and in this context, appearance is no 
longer understood as opposed to reality, as dismissing or deceiving from reality, which is 
                                                 
25
 Case C-175/11 D. and A. [2013], §95-97. 
26
 For reasons of clarity, I use the masculine form throughout this dissertation, although the feminine is always 
equally implied.  
27
 A judge who appears to be independent is not necessarily independent. This is because appearance of 
independence is only one of the evaluation criteria of judicial independence.  
  
 
  7 
 
 
perceived as being the truth.
28
 Nor is it an illusion, or in Sartre’s words, “that which is not 
being”29, or the insignificant part of the reality as in Plato’s allegory of the cave.30 As a 
consequence, under certain circumstances, appearance is reality, and reality is made of 
appearances. In this regard, in order to understand the importance of the concept of 
appearance of independence, one has first to realize that appearance and reality cannot be 
separated in this framework.
31
 Indeed, such an approach has two major consequences.  
First, the objectivity of reality must be rethought. In the scope of the concept of 
appearance of independence, appearance is reality because it is the reality from the point of 
view of a determined actor. As a result, appearance is still reality even if this reality can be 
perceived as being different from the point of view of a different actor. A judge might then 
appear to be absolutely independent to the first actor, while he would not appear to be so to 
the second one.
32
 Let us say, for instance,
33
 that A has a disagreement with the State on the 
interpretation of a tax law. Between two hearings, A discovers that the judge is negotiating 
with the State in order to become an official of the Ministry of Finance. In this case, the judge 
would not appear to be independent to A. Yet, a third judge might consider that, in reality, the 
judge at stake has a strong statute protecting his independence and works perfectly 
independently. There would then be two realities: the appearance-reality of A and the 
realistic-reality of the third judge. In this regard, reality is not objective anymore inasmuch as 
there is not only one reality. However, it is still objective insofar as appearances can be 
expressed objectively. This condition is essential to the concept of appearance of 
                                                 
28
 Martens, P. (2002), “Réflexions sur le maniérisme judiciaire”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’Homme, p. 
337.  
29
 Sartre, J.-P. (1956), Being and Nothingness, (New York: The Philosophical Library), 1956.  
30
 McKoski, R. J. (2010), “Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety: What the Public Sees Is What 
the Justice Gets”, Minnesota Law Review, vol. 94, p. 1916. 
31
 This approach reminds the abolition of the dualism of being and appearance claimed by Jean-Paul Sartre in 
Being and Nothingness: there is no more “being-behind-the-appearance” (Sartre, J.-P., op. cit., p. xlvi). Sartre 
claimed that “the dualism of being and appearance is no longer entitled to any legal status within philosophy”. 
He then considered that “modern thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the 
series of appearances which manifest it” (ibidem, p. xlv). 
32
 In that sense, the European Court of Human Rights Stated that: “regardless of the acknowledged objectivity of 
the Advocate-General or his equivalent, that officer, in recommending that an appeal on points of law should be 
allowed or dismissed, became objectively speaking the ally or opponent of one of the parties and that his 
presence at the deliberations afforded him, if only to outward appearances, an additional opportunity to bolster 
his submissions in private, without fear of contradiction” (Kress v. France, no. 39594/98, ECHR, 2001, §82). 
See also Borgers v. Belgium, no. 12005/86, ECHR, 1991, §26.  
33
 I took my inspiration from a real case. See Sacilor Lormines v. France, no. 65411/01, ECHR, 2006. 
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independence. Otherwise, appearance could not be reality. In order to express appearances 
objectively, the standard applied should be as follows: different reasonable persons could 
perceive the same reality as the actor concerned if they observe the appearance from his point 
of view.
34
  
Second, in the scope of the concept of appearance of independence, appearances are not 
designed to replace reality. As a consequence, when I claim that the selection procedure of 
the judges should be organized in such a way that it would more take appearances into 
account, I certainly do not claim that this procedure should only be an appearance 
disconnected from any reality. On the contrary, I claim that appearances should reinforce 
reality, not deceive from it. Again, an appearance that could not be perceived as reality from 
the point of view of the reasonable person would not fall within the scope of the concept of 
appearance of independence or within the scope of my submission. Let us illustrate this point 
more concretely. Let us imagine three different selection procedures of judges. In the first 
one, the Minister just picks a judge subjectively and appoints him. In the second one, a panel 
with a high reputation of independence selects a judge following a very objective, public and 
transparent procedure. In the third one, a panel selects a judge following a procedure, which 
is supposed to be objective, public, transparent, and ran by independent people. However, 
upon closer examination, the reasonable person can see that this procedure has only been 
designed in order to hide the reality, which is that the judge appointed had been selected from 
the true beginning. These three examples illustrate three different relationships between 
reality and appearance. These are reality out of appearances, reality supported by 
appearances, and reality disconnected from appearances. In the first situation, there is a 
reality out of appearances, that is to say a reality built out of any concern regarding 
appearances.
35
 Even if the judge selected would have been selected in any case, he has been 
chosen in such a way that none appearance can support the reality of his superior 
competences towards the public. In the second situation, reality is supported by appearances. 
Strong appearances reinforce the righteousness of the appointment of the judge to the public. 
                                                 
34
 See below. 
35
 This is slightly different from a reality without appearances, which does not exist. For instance, in the case 
provided as an example above, even though the selection procedure is organized without any concern regarding 
appearances, it still has an appearance.  
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Finally, in the last situation, reality is disconnected from appearances. The judge selected 
might be great or not. Appearances do not tell anything on reality. They can deceive it or not, 
but they can certainly not support it. Throughout these examples, my will is to show that my 
claim, which is that appearances should be taken into account in the selection procedure of 
the judges, does only rely on a reality perceived as being supported by appearances, as 
opposed to a reality built out of appearances or disconnected from appearances. Appearances 
should then not be ignored as they are in the first situation because, as explained below, they 
matter too much to do so. Nor should they be exposed as a mask showing an illusory 
appearance and hiding a shameful reality, as they are in the third situation. Appearances 
should be taken into account in order to strengthen reality towards the public. This idea and 
these nuances are at the core of the concept of appearance of independence. As a 
consequence, being interested in appearances does not mean neglecting reality. On the 
contrary, it means being interested in reinforcing reality.  
3. Why does appearance matter?36 
A major concern of this dissertation is to explain why appearance matters. This is all the 
more necessary knowing that there is a tendency to ignore or to neglect this issue in the 
European Union law village (a). Yet, the context in which the Court of Justice has to work is 
very specific and should lead to consider its appearance as a primary concern (b). I will then 
explain why the appearance of independence matters (d) after exposing to whom judges must 
appear to be independent (c). 
a. Ignoring appearances in the European Union Law village 
Above all, it is important to underline the lack of interest regarding the issue of the 
appearance of independence of the Court of Justice in the European Union Law village, 
especially when it comes to evaluating it through the selection procedure of the judges. This 
                                                 
36
 In common law, the importance of appearances belongs to the principle of “open justice”. According to this 
principle, proceedings must be open to the public, including the contents of court files and public viewing of 
trials. See Spigelman, J. J. (2006), “The Principle of Open Justice: A Comparative Perspective”, University of 
New South Wales Law Journal, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 147-166. See also Nettheim, G. (1984), “The Principle of 
Open Justice”, University of Tasmania Law Review, no. 8, p. 28; Baylis, C. (2001) “Justice Done and Justice 
Seen to be Done – The Public Administration of Justice”, Victoria University Law Review, no. 21, p. 177. 
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lack of interest can be observed in the literature, since there is little written on this issue.
37
 
There is a tendency among European Union law lawyers, scholars, and judges to avoid the 
issue by looking exclusively at the quality of the decisions of the Court.
38
 In their view, 
judges of the Court of Justice can be seen to be independent because they produce decisions 
of good quality.
39
 Since these decisions concretely show their independence, why should one 
bother with simple appearances? The Court of Justice itself seems to be more interested in the 
competences of the judges than in their independence.
40
 However, such an approach cannot 
be satisfying for four reasons. 
 
First, this approach moves the issue of appearance to the issue of quality. In this regard, it 
is based on a wrong premise: judges who do not appear to be independent can take good 
decisions, especially considering they might appear to be independent from the point of view 
of someone else.  
Second, this approach does not meet the rationale of the concept of appearance of 
independence. As explained below, appearance of independence is required because judges 
must inspire confidence to the public. People should be able to trust their judges when they 
expect them to take a decision. As a consequence, appearance of independence is appreciated 
ex ante, before the judgement, when facing the judge, while the quality of the decision is 
appreciated ex post, after the judgement delivery. These are then two different concepts that 
cannot be confused.  
Third, this approach does not meet the expectations of the public. People can never accept 
things they are not allowed to see, observe or know without any reasonable justification.
41
 As 
a consequence, they could never accept an opaque selection of the judges, since such a 
procedure would only let the shadow of suspicion hovers over it, while it could not be 
reasonably justified. This foundation of the concept of appearance of independence cannot be 
compensated by the quality of the decisions, in particular because of the previous argument. 
                                                 
37
 Kelemen, R. D., op. cit., p. 50. 
38
 Several members of the Court of Justice share this point of view. I do not cite them by name in order to keep 
the confidentiality of our conversations.  
39
 Naturally, the quality of the decisions of the Court of Justice might be discussed. However, this is a whole 
topic in itself and I do not intend to discuss it here.  
40
 Case C-175/11 D. and A. [2013], §99. See above, section 6b for a more detailed explanation. 
41
 Richmond Newspapers inc v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), at 571-572.  
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Four, this approach does actually not correspond to reality. In fact, the 255 Committee 
established by the Lisbon Treaty in order to give an opinion on the suitability of the 
candidates for the position of judges at the Court of Justice has a double task. It does not only 
have “to make sure that the selected judges have the necessary qualities to perform their 
future duties”, which refers to a pure issue of competence, but it also has to “distance the 
mechanism for appointing judges from political passions and power issues”, which refers to 
the issue of the selection of the judges and thus to the issue of their appearance of 
independence.
42
 
Aristotle distinguished two kinds of virtues of the rulers when he was conceiving the 
organization of society: intellectual and moral virtues. Intellectual virtues should guarantee 
the competences of the rulers, while moral virtues should inspire confidence to people in 
them. The moral virtue of Aristotle can be assimilated to an “institutional based-trust”, that 
is to say a confidence related to the structure of an institution that guarantees some 
characteristics, such as the appearance of independence of the judges of the Court of Justice 
ensured through the selection procedure.
43
 In this view, this issue is not anymore a matter of 
morality, but rather an institutional issue. Still, regarding the lack of interest of the European 
Union Law village for this issue, this village seems to focus on the intellectual virtue and to 
ignore the moral one. I will argue below that such a selective approach is unfortunate.  
b. The specific context of the Court of Justice 
The issue of the appearance of independence is all the more important considering the 
specific institutional context in which the Court of Justice has to work.  
First, since there is one judge for each Member State, there is already a “tension between 
representativeness and the independence” of the judges of the Court of Justice.44 Indeed, one 
                                                 
42
 Sauvé, J.-M., “La sélection des juges de l’Union européenne : la pratique du comité de l’article 255”, op. cit., 
p. 2 (my translation). This goal of the 255 Committee, and its creation as well, contradict the expectations of 
some authors before (see Legal, H. (2001), “Composition et fonctionnement des Cours européennes”, Pouvoirs, 
no. 96, p. 76). Regarding the relationship between the selection procedure of the judges and their appearance of 
independence, see below. 
43
 Zucker, L. G. (1986), “Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840-1920”, in B. M. 
Staw & L. L. Cummings (eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior, p. 53-111. 
44
 Dehousse, R. (1994), La Cour de Justice des communautés européennes, (Paris: Montchrestien), p. 17. See 
also Malenovski, J. (2011), op. cit., vol. 349, p. 89-91. When proceeding to judicial appointments to the U.S. 
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might consider that this organization is not designed to guarantee the independence of the 
judges but on the contrary, to ensure that they will be good ambassadors for their Member 
States. As a consequence, the appearance of independence of the judges of the Court of 
Justice is already fragile. Surely, it is not ignored. As a matter of fact, their representativeness 
can also be a good thing, since it can lead the public to feel represented, which is important 
regarding its perception of the judges and, therefore, their legitimacy.
45
 Judges are legitimate 
when they are perceived in such a way that people accept their authority.
46
 In this respect, 
judges cannot be considered to be legitimate when they cannot be seen to be independent. As 
a result, the public can only trust its judges if it is convinced that they represent it and not the 
interests of their Member State. Still, given the fragility of the appearance of independence of 
the judges of the Court of Justice, it is even more important to ensure they appear to be 
independent regarding the manner of their selection.  
Second, addressing the issue of appearance of independence of the judges of the Court of 
Justice at this time is not innocent. My concern regarding this issue is in particular due to the 
fact that appearances play a key role for the development of confidence. Confidence in the 
European Union has decreased a lot between 2007 and 2013.
47
 The Court of Justice is 
particularly badly placed in this context. First, it is the less trusted European institution. Only 
a minority of people trust the Court.
48
 Second, it is less trusted than national Courts.
49
 The 
unpopularity of the Court of Justice might explain why the issue of the selection of its judges 
                                                                                                                                                       
Supreme Court, the President does also take representational criterion into account, including the geographical 
origin of the appointee. See Kahn, M. A. (1995), “The Appointment of a Supreme Court Justice: A Political 
Process from Beginning to End”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1, p. 33. 
45
 Dehousse, R., op. cit., p. 17. See also Ritleng, D. op. cit. 
46
 Ritleng, D. op. cit. 
47
 57% of the interviewed people trusted the European Union in spring 2007, while they were only 31% in 
autumn 2013. In the same time, confidence in national parliament and government has also decreased, 
respectively from 43% to 25% and from 41% to 23%. The decreasing is still significantly higher for the 
European Union, with a loss of 26%, than for national parliaments and governments, with a loss of 18%. See 
European Commission (2013), Public opinion in the European Union, Standard Eurobarometer no. 80, 
http://ec.europa.eu, p. 5.  
48
 Arnold, Ch., Sapir, E. V. and Zapryanova, G. (2012): “Trust in the institutions of the European Union: A 
cross-country examination”, in L. Beaudonnet and D. Di Mauro (eds) “Beyond Euro-skepticism: Understanding 
attitudes towards the EU”, EIoP, Special Mini-Issue 2, Vol. 16, Article 8, p. 20. 
49
 Arnold, Ch., Sapir, E. V. and Zapryanova, G., op. cit., p. 20. In the EU, 53% of people tend to trust justice in 
their own member State. However, this level of trust can be very different from one member State to another. It 
is very high in some countries such as Finland (85%), while it is very low in others, such as Slovenia (24%). See 
European Commission (2013), Justice in the EU, flash eurobarometer no. 385, http://ec.europa.eu, p. 13-14. 
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is not openly discussed despite its importance for the public.
50
 The level of public confidence 
in the Court is so low that people might not be interested in knowing how its judges are 
selected. They just do not trust the Court. Moreover, as I will show below, the selection 
procedure of the judges of the Court of Justice can be very opaque. People rarely debate over 
things made in secret before they are made public or, at least, before the secrecy has been 
unveiled. 
c. To whom must judges appear to be independent? 
Naturally, judges must appear to be independent to the parties at stake. But, more broadly, 
they must appear to be independent to the public. Three elements indicate this solution. 
First, the European Court of Human Rights has stated that judges must inspire confidence 
“in the public and above all, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, in the 
accused”.51 This clearly shows that parties are the priority, but not the exclusive target of this 
confidence and therefore of this appearance. 
Second, the reasonable doubt regarding the appearance of independence of a judge must 
be appreciated from the point of view of any reasonable person in the same circumstances of 
the party at stake, and not only from the point of view of the party itself.
52
 This also shows 
that the judge must appear to be independent to the public, and not only to the party at stake. 
Third, the democratic role of the judges is expressed through their relationship with the 
public. This relationship is expressed through the idea that judges must render justice to the 
public, the demos. Judges must render justice to every citizen.
53
 This relationship is also 
expressed through the right to a public trial.
54
 This right expresses two ideas. First, the public 
is concerned with judicial decisions. Second, the public can control judges. Therefore, the 
                                                 
50
 This general statement must be qualified. In Italy, for instance, a parliamentarian interpellation has already 
been presented in order to know the selection criteria of the judges of the Court of Justice (Atti parliamentary, 
Camera dei Deputati, XVI legislatura, Allegato B ai Resoconti, Seduta del’8 marzo 2012, Interrogaziona a 
riposta orale 3-02154, p. 28664). 
51
 Incal v. Turkey [GC], no. 22678/93, ECHR, 1998, §71. See also Sahiner v. Turkey, no. 29279/95, ECHR, 
2001, §44 and Hauschildt v. Denmark, no. 10486/83, ECHR, 1989, §48. 
52
 See below. 
53
 Kenny, S. (1999), “Maintaining Public Confidence in the Judiciary: A Precarious Equilibrium”, Monash 
University Law Review, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 210. 
54
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] O.J. C83/02, Art. 47. 
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public has a right to attend proceedings. As a consequence, judges must appear independent 
to every person who attends the hearing that is to say, virtually, everyone.
55
 
d. Appearance is a matter of trust 
Appearance of independence is at the core of judicial independence. This principle is 
referred to in the famous legal maxim: “justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to 
be done”.56 Yet, its importance has still to be explained. 
Appearance of independence matters for judicial independence because of confidence. 
Judges cannot render justice if they do not inspire confidence to the public. It is for this 
reason that the European Court of Human Rights takes appearances into account when “they 
are necessary to establish or to maintain the confidence that tribunals must inspire to the 
public”.57  This rationale for the appearance of independence can be analysed from two 
standpoints. First, from a general standpoint, judges must inspire confidence to the public, 
which includes, in particular, investors. Second, from a more specific standpoint, the Court of 
Justice must inspire confidence to all the actors who participate in the construction of the 
European Union. 
As a preliminary observation, it is essential to clarify the statute of confidence in sciences 
before proceeding further. This statute has considerably evolved throughout the history of 
                                                 
55
 Spigelman, J. J. (2000), “Seen to be Done : The Principle of Open Justice”, Australian Law Journal, no. 74, p. 
290. 
56
 This legal maxim appeared for the first time in an English case (Rex v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy 
(1924), 1 K.B. 256, 259). It is generally attributed to Lord Gordon HewArt. However, this is quiet surprising, 
knowing that he was known to be extremely “biased and incompetent” (Spencer, J. R. (1989), Jackson’s 
Machinery of Justice, Cambridge University Press, 8th ed., p. 375) and even as “the worst english judge in 
living memory” (ibidem (1977), 7th ed., p. 475. See also, in the same sense, Lord Devlin (1985), Easing the 
passing: the trial of Dr John Bodkin Adams (London: Bodly)). Actually, there is evidence that Lord Gordon 
Hewart did not care at all of appearances (see Spigelman, J. J. (2000), “Seen to be Done : The Principle of Open 
Justice”, op. cit.).  According to Spigelman (ibidem), the legal maxim should then be attributed to Lord Sankey, 
who wrote that “the Bar is just as important as the Bench in the administration of justice, and misunderstandings 
between the Bar and the Bench are regrettable, for they prevent the attainment of that which all of us desire - 
namely, that justice should not only be done, but should appear to have been done” (Hobbs v. Tinling and 
Company Limited, 1929, 2kb1, at 48). Still, the legal maxim has been adopted by the European Court of Human 
Rights, in particular, in De Cubber v. Belgium, no. 9186/80, ECHR, 1984, §26 and Micaleff v. Malta, no. 
17056/06, ECHR, 2009, §98. 
57
 Gilliaux, P., op. cit., p. 15 (my translation). See Piersack v. Belgium, no. 8692/79, ECHR, 1982, §30 and 
Remli v. France, no. 16838/90, ECHR, 1996, §48. 
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ideas.
58
 Plato had already seen a link between appearance and confidence. As has been point 
out above, he perceived appearances as deceiving from reality. Plato then thought there was 
no room for appearances in a rational world. As a consequence, since appearances and 
confidence were strongly related in his opinion, there was neither room for confidence in a 
rational world. Indeed, in Greek mythology, confidence used to be a social link between 
people who shared a same belief perceived as the truth.
59
 However, in Plato’s view, only 
certainty based on rationality can lead to the truth. As a result, there was an opposition 
between confidence, conceived as an opinion, and rationality, conceived as a certainty.
60
 The 
same reasoning led Descartes to consider confidence as an “illusory belief”.61 Confidence 
has then been kept away from sciences for centuries. It is only recently that confidence 
appeared again in sociology, but mostly in economics. I will now develop the statute of 
confidence in the concept of appearance of independence throughout the following detailed 
explanation of the rationale of this concept. 
From a general point of view, appearance of independence is necessary in a democratic 
society, because judges must inspire confidence to the people.
62
Judges must then appear to be 
independent in order to raise public confidence in them. Five reasons explain this. 
                                                 
58
 See Neveu, V. (2004), “La confiance organisationnelle : définition et mesure”, in Actes du XVème congrès de 
l'AGRH, tome 2, p. 1072. 
59
 Neveu, V., op. cit., p. 1072. 
60
 Neveu, V., op. cit., p. 1072. 
61
 Neveu, V., op. cit., p. 1073. 
62
 Findlay v. the United Kingdom, no. 22107/93, ECHR, 1997, §76; Incal v. Turkey [GC], no. 22678/93, ECHR, 
1998, §71; Sahiner v. Turkey, no. 29279/95, ECHR, 2001, §48. The issue of public confidence in the Courts is 
central in the American literature. One might be tempted to think that the American literature’s interest for 
public confidence in the judiciary is due to the fact that, in the U.S., the public elects the judges. However, the 
literature focuses on the public support for Supreme Court, while there is very little literature regarding State 
Courts (Wenzel, J. P. et al., op. cit., p. 193). Since judges of the American Supreme Court are not elected, but 
appointed by the President with the approval of the Senate, the American literature’s interest for public 
confidence in the judiciary cannot be reduced to the election system. Regarding public confidence in the 
Supreme Court, one can find two assumptions (Wenzel, J. P. et al., op. cit., p. 192). Some authors think this 
support comes from a general reverence, which is due to the status of the Court as an institution and its 
relationship with the Constitution (See Casey, G. (1974), “The Supreme Court and myth”, Law and Society 
Review, vol. 8, p. 385-419; Jaros, D. and Roper, R. (1980), “The U.S. Supreme Court: Myth, diffuse support, 
specific support, and legitimacy”, American Politics Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 85-105). Others suggest it comes 
from the fact that the Court is seen as the guardian of the rule of law and then as the most democratic institution 
(See Caldeira, G.A. and Gibson, J.L., “The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court”, op. cit., 635–
664). In that sense, the public support of the Court would come from its specific decisions (See Caldeira, G. A., 
“Neither the purse nor the sword: Dynamics of public support for the United States Supreme Court”, op. cit., p. 
1209-1226; Caldeira, G. (1991), “Courts and public opinion” in J. B. Gates and C. Johnson (eds.), The American 
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First, judges must appear to be independent in any democratic society because, as a 
democratic institution, they must have legitimacy. This legitimacy comes for a large part 
from the public confidence and support.
63
 As a matter of fact, public support is all the more 
important for the judges considering they have “neither the purse nor the sword”64. Another 
reason that justifies the necessity of judicial appearance of independence in democracy comes 
from Locke’s political philosophy. In his view, society relies on the mutual confidence 
between the rulers and the ruled.
65
 In a democracy, the ruled retire their confidence to the 
rulers when they do not trust them anymore.
66
 As a result, rulers are not democratic and 
legitimate anymore and they must change. This principle applies to all democratic institutions 
that have to be legitimate, including judges. Judges have then to give signs to the public, if 
they want it to support them.
67
 Otherwise, without confidence, the public might be less likely 
to comply with the rulings of the judges.
68
As a consequence, judges remain on the goodwill 
of the public.
69
 This maybe joins Hart’s concept of law. In his view, judicial authority relies 
on the public acceptance of this authority. Such a public acceptance is not possible without 
public confidence. Therefore, basing judicial authority on the public acceptance of its 
authority or on the public confidence in this authority might be seen as two merging 
                                                                                                                                                       
courts: A critical assessment (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly); Hoekstra, V. J. (2000), “The 
Supreme Court and local public opinion”, American Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. 1, p. 89-100; Mondak, 
J. J. and Smithey, S. I. (1997), “The dynamics of public support for the Supreme Court”, Journal of Politics, vol. 
59, no. 4, p. 1114-1142; Tannenhaus, J. and Murphy, W. (1981), “Patterns of public support for the Supreme 
Court”, Journal of Politics, vol. 48, no. 1, p. 24-39). These propositions are not contradictory, but may be seen 
as complementary: the public support is made of a general or diffuse support and a more specific support (See 
Murphy, W. F. and Tanenhaus, J. (1990), “Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court”, Northwestern University 
Law Review, vol. 84, p. 985-1023; Caldeira, G.A. and Gibson, J.L., “The Etiology of Public Support for the 
Supreme Court”, op. cit., p. 636-638). Still, I do not claim that appearance of independence is the only or the 
most important component of public confidence in judges. I only claim that it is an essential criterion to 
generate public confidence. 
63
 Wenzel, J. P., Bowler, S., Lanoue, D. J. (2003), “The Sources of Public Confidence in State Courts. 
Experience and Institutions”, American Politics Research, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 192. 
64
 Caldeira, G. A. (1986), “Neither the purse nor the sword: Dynamics of public support for the United States 
Supreme Court”, American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 4, p. 1209-1226. 
65
 Marzano, M. (2012), op. cit., p. 85.  
66
 Locke thinks that confidence is conditional, while Hobbes claims it is absolute so that people cannot question 
it (Marzano, M. (2012), op. cit., p. 85). 
67
 Caldeira G. A. and Gibson J. L. (1995), “The legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European Union: 
Models of institutional support”, American Political Science Review, vol. 89, no. 2, p. 356-376. 
68
 See Murphy, W. F. and Tanenhaus, J. (1968a), “Public Opinion and the Supreme Court: The Goldwater 
Campaign”, Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 1, p. 31–50; Murphy, W. F. and Tanenhaus, J. (1968b),  
“Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: A Preliminary Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court 
Legitimation of Regime Changes”, Law and Society Review, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 357–382; Tyler, T. R. (1990), Why 
People Obey the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press). 
69
 Wenzel, J. P. et al., op. cit., p. 192. 
  
 
  17 
 
 
concepts.
70
 In a similar vein, the European Court of Human Rights has justified “the growing 
importance attached to appearances” by “the public’s increased sensitivity to the fair 
administration of justice”. 71  This naturally includes the public interest in judicial 
appointments.
72
  
Second, public confidence is essential for judges, because there is a huge asymmetry of 
knowledge between the public and them. From this point of view, public confidence involves 
a belief in the judge.
73
 People rely on judges because they trust them, and they trust them 
because they believe they are able to render justice. Law, and in particular European Union 
Law, is so complex that people who are not experts in this field do not have any other choice 
than trusting judges in order to reduce uncertainty.
74
 Even more simply, once one has 
submitted his case to a judge, he has to trust him. As a matter of fact, faith is implicit in the 
notion of confidence.
75
 According to the Oxford dictionary, confidence is defined as “the 
feeling or belief that one can have faith in or rely on someone or something”.76 Such a 
definition can be better understood in the light of the Latin etymology of the word confidence, 
confidere, which means having full trust. Trust and belief are essential to confidence. Indeed, 
it requires the weakest party to trust the strongest one. Moreover, the one who gives his 
confidence to someone else becomes necessarily vulnerable, because he becomes dependent 
of this person.
77
 Confidence is then a “human bet” 78 at the core of society: on the one hand, 
every society relies on a minimum level of confidence but, on the other hand, this confidence 
can be disappointed or betrayed.
79
 This is the belief dimension of confidence: people trust the 
judges because they accept to see them to be independent and competent, but they can never 
                                                 
70
 Kenny, S., op. cit., p. 213. 
71
 Kress v. France, no. 39594/98, ECHR, 2001, §82. See also Borgers v. Belgium, no. 12005/86, ECHR, 1991, 
§24.  
72
 Lord Mance, The composition of the European Court of Justice, op. cit., p. 6. 
73
 Miller, A. S. (1970), “Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections”, Law and 
Contemporary Problems, vol. 35, no.1, p. 74. 
74
 Luhmann, N. (1979), Trust and Power (Chichester: J. Wiley & Sons). See also Giddens, A. (1990), The 
Consequences of Modernity (Stanford University Press) and Neveu, V., op. cit., p. 1075-1076. 
75
 For this reason, confidence has been analised as a faith by Thomas Aquinas in his famous Summa Theologica. 
As a consequence, he thought that only christian people are faithworthy. See Marzano, M. (2012), “Qu’est-ce 
que la confiance ?”, Revue Interdisciplinaire sur le Management et l’Humanisme, n°1, p. 85. 
76
 Stevenson, A. (2010), Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, p. 365. 
77
 Marzano, M. (2010), “Qu’est-ce que la confiance ?”, Etudes, Janvier, vol. 412, no. 1, p. 53. 
78
 Marzano, M. (2012), op. cit., p. 85-86. 
79
 Marzano, M. (2012), op. cit., p. 85-86. 
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be absolutely sure that the judges will provide a correct and independent judgment. As a 
consequence, in order to be the recognized and trusted expert of the European Union law 
system,
80
 judges of the Court of Justice must give signs to the public in order to raise its 
confidence in them. Otherwise, without confidence, the public might be less likely to submit 
cases to the judges.
81
  
Third, judges need public confidence in order to preserve their credibility regarding the 
other powers.
82
 This is because, from a certain perspective, judges are part of “the system”. 
On the one hand, they represent the power, together with the other institutions they have to 
control.
83
 On the other hand, they are “charged with the ultimate decision over life, freedoms, 
rights, duties and property of citizens” regarding the laws and acts established by the 
power.
84
 Regarding their specific institutional position, judges must then appear to be 
independent to the public, which seeks and expects justice.
85
 Obviously, a judge would not 
have any credibility if he would appear to be connected or influenced by the power that made 
or applied the law, that is to say, to be this power.
86
  
Four, judges need public confidence to consolidate their independence regarding the 
political power and to function adequately.
87
 This is because “the higher the levels of diffuse 
public support for a court, the greater the costs politicians will face for attempting to 
undermine that court’s independence or to otherwise challenge its rulings”. 88  So, 
schematically speaking, judges must ensure the respect of the rule of law, which requires 
                                                 
80
 Neveu, V., op. cit., p. 1075-1076. See also Giddens, A., op. cit., and Luhmann, N., op. cit. 
81
 See Roberts, J. V., and Stalans, L. J. (1997), Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice (Boulder: 
Westview Press). 
82
 European Commission (2012), Report on Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism, op. cit., p. 20. 
83
 Judges have to ensure that “governments and the administration can be held to account for their actions, and, 
with regard to the legislature, it is involved in ensuring that duly enacted laws are enforced, and, to a greater or 
lesser extent, in ensuring that they comply with any relevant constitution or higher law (such as that of the 
European Union)”. (Consultative Council of European Judges (2001), op. cit., Art. 11). 
84
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them to function adequately. This requires that judges beneficiate from public support, which 
in turn requires the public to trust the judges.
89
  
Five, judges do also need to appear to be independent in order to raise public confidence 
from an economic point of view.
90
 As a matter of fact, confidence is a key element for the 
effectiveness and promotion of economic activities, and it is at the core of almost all of 
them.
91
 Schematically speaking, economic activities can be seen as relying on a horizontal 
and a vertical confidence. Horizontal confidence refers to the mutual and interpersonal 
confidence between people that allows them to conclude economic agreements.
92
 Vertical 
confidence does rather refer to the trust shared by all the actors in an actor, such as the 
authority that emits the money regarding its ability to guarantee its value.
93
 In this regard, 
judges appear to be key actors attracting vertical confidence regarding their ability to 
guarantee the rights of individuals independently. As a consequence, the European 
Commission has recently stated that efficient and independent justice systems “play a key 
role in [contributing and] restoring confidence [for the investors] and the return to 
growth”. 94  This led the European Commission to create the European Union Justice 
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Scoreboard in 2013, an indicator designed to promote effective justice and growth.
95
 Since 
this scoreboard is based on the idea that judicial independence generates confidence among 
investors, it includes findings based on indicators built on the independence of national 
judicial systems, as investors perceive it.
96
 The World Justice Project
97
 and the World 
Economic Forum in its annual Global Competitiveness Report
98
 also use the notion of 
perceived independence. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
refers to the notion of trust in the government, which includes in particular trust in an 
independent judiciary.
99
 In then turns out that investors do not look at rules committed to 
paper, but rather at what is translated in reality, that is to say at what they can concretely see, 
at what appears to them.
100
  
From a more specific point of view, the appearance of independence of the judges of the 
Court of Justice is all the more essential to the Court of justice must be appreciated regarding 
how great a role it plays in the construction of the European Union
101
. Surely, the Court of 
Justice is the most powerful Court in Europe. All judges, including the national highest 
Courts and the Member States must comply with its case law. But it also shapes a union of 
law
102
and through law.
103
 Throughout its case law, the Court of Justice has “cemented the 
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development of Europe”.104 It has played “a central role in driving forward the process of 
European integration”,105 in particular by establishing the principles of direct effect and 
primacy of European Union Law.
106
 The European Union is a construction, a common 
project of sovereign Member States, who decided to build together an internal market and an 
area of freedom, security and justice. Such a project needs the confidence of each participant. 
Everyone has to be sure that the others will respect the rules.
107
 Surely, the European Union 
is based on the rule of law, but the rule of law would be meaningless without an independent 
judicial system.
108
 In this regard, the founding of the Court of Justice “was supported by the 
great vision that conflicts in a future Europe should not be the cause of war or subject to 
political and economic struggles but should be solved by common institutions using legal 
means or negotiation in an atmosphere of collaboration between former enemies”.109 For this 
reason, the authority of the Court of Justice is obligatory to every Member State
110
. It is not 
possible to join the European Union without accepting its authority. This authority is even 
exclusive: only the Court can judge the interpretation and the application of the Treaties.
111
 
The Court of Justice is thus clearly consubstantial to the European project. Therefore, it is 
crucial for all the participants to the European construction to be completely confident in the 
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independence of this supreme arbiter.
112
 In this context, the Court of Justice has to appear 
particularly independent in order to create confidence among all the Member States. This 
looks even more crucial considering that “attacks on the legitimacy of the Court of Justice 
come primarily from the Member States”.113 
For all of these reasons, appearance of independence of the judges should always be a 
primary concern. The European Commission has already particularly insisted on the fact that 
public confidence rests in particular on judicial independence.
114
 In this regard, the European 
Union expects that new Member States, such as Bulgaria and Romania, give more 
consideration to the appearance of independence of their judges, in order to increase public 
confidence in their judicial system.
115
 It is time to show the same concern for the Court of 
Justice. It is absolutely unthinkable that the Court of Justice, which is so powerful and which 
plays such an important role in the construction of the European Union could generate any 
doubt regarding its independence. In that sense, the Court must not only be independent, it 
must also be seen to be absolutely independent. As Lord Bowen put it: “Judges, like 
Caesar’s wife, should be above suspicion”.116 Therefore, it is the interest of the European 
Union to adopt transparent and objective selection procedures of the judges of the Court of 
Justice in order to avoid any doubt as to their independence.
117
 These procedures are at the 
core of the next section. 
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4. How does the selection of the judges affect their appearance of independence? 
How a judge is selected is likely to affect his appearance of independence
118
. In this 
regard, the Court of Justice has judged that “[…] guarantees concerning the composition of 
the tribunal are the corner stone of the right to a fair trial”,119 which embodies guarantees 
concerning the selection of the judges.
120
 The main concern is about political selections and 
appointments.
121
 This is because such selections and appointments weaken public confidence 
in the judges.
122
 The European Union shares this concern. It is for this reason that it has 
created the “255 Committee” 123 or, for instance, that it has criticized the political influence 
on a number of key judicial appointments in Bulgaria.
124
 
Selecting judges for political reasons weakens their appearance of independence because 
it does not respect the principle of the separation of powers,
125
 which is the original rationale 
behind the principle of judicial independence.
126
 If a judge has been selected because of some 
political favours, he will not appear to be independent, to be a separated power. On the 
contrary, he will be identified to this power.  
In this context, one must distinguish judicial appointments only made by a political body 
from such appointments made for political reasons. If selecting judges for political reasons 
necessarily weakens their appearance of independence, the mere fact that a political body 
appoints a judge does not affect their appearance of independence in itself. Indeed, as long as 
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judges have a strong statute, which protects them from any political dismissal,
127
 the decisive 
issue is not about the authority that appoints them, but rather about the authority that selects 
them and the reasons that motivated its choice. In many Member States, judges are appointed 
by the government while selected and proposed by an independent body. In such cases, the 
authority of appointment does not undermine the appearance of independence of the judges. 
However, the situation is different when the political authority proceeds to the selection of 
the judges through their appointment. Indeed, the selection procedure of the judges 
constitutes a mechanism “through which political actors can influence courts to make 
judgments that do not diverge excessively from the political actors’ preferences”.128 The 
selection procedure of the judges might even be the opportunity for the political power “to 
staff the court with judges who reflect political actors’ preferences”.129  
The appointment of the U.S. Supreme Court judges by the American President constitutes 
a good and famous example to illustrate this point. The candidates are selected and appointed 
by the President and should be confirmed by the Senate.
130
 The selection procedure clearly 
constitutes a political process at the two stages.
131
 First, when the President proceeds to the 
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selection, he looks for candidates’ political opinions rather than for their competences.132 As 
a result, appointees are nearly always from the same political party as the President.
133
 
Second, when the Senate proceeds to the confirmation, it can reject a candidate when it 
perceives its opinions as a threat to its political agenda.
134
 This might also happen and 
happened despite the high competences of the candidate.
135
 In this context, candidates are 
questioned on “their beliefs, their views on the law or their previous decisions”.136 Although 
they are not asked how they will rule on forthcoming cases or how they would have ruled on 
leading cases, candidates are questioned on their judicial philosophy in order to indirectly 
learn how they would vote on hot issues.
137
  
The selection procedure of the judges of the Court of Justice is also led by political 
considerations in some Member States of the European Union. By providing that candidates 
to the position of judge at the Court of Justice should be of recognised competence, the TFEU 
excludes exlusively political selections.
138
 As a result, no candidate could be selected only for 
political reasons. Yet, political reasons can still be decisive in the choice of a candidate, just 
as it is the case in the United States, where judges are selected for political reasons, but never, 
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or at least almost never, irrespective of their competences
139
, and where they are sometimes 
not selected only for political reasons.
140
  
Concretely, in 1998, Alter has observed that, in selecting judges for the Court of Justice, 
France and Germany took into account candidates’ opinions regarding European integration 
in order to limit the judicial activism of the Court.
141
 Surely, only these two Member States 
on the eight analysed by Alter took this factor into consideration, but still, they did. This 
example thus shows that, if Member States come to consider that the Court of Justice has 
gone too far in the European integration, they might seek to send Euroskeptic judges to the 
Court.
142
 More recently, the Czech Republic asked to a candidate what she would do to 
safeguard the Czech interests once at the Court. She answered that she did not have to defend 
the interests of her State, but to apply European Union law and guarantee its respect. As a 
consequence, the government did not nominate this candidate and preferred to disobey the 
rules of its own selection procedure to nominate another one.
143
  
The consequence of political selections of judges is that one might fear that the political 
power expects the judge to follow certain guidelines or, at least, to return the favour.
144
 In 
such a case, the judge would not be seen to be independent, because people would fear that 
his judgement would be biased in favour of the political power.
145
 Otherwise, the judge 
would be removed.  
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In the United States, political appointments are not perceived as questioning the 
independence of the judges of the Supreme Court, because they benefit from a strong statute, 
which makes them free to take their decisions without being influenced, or having to fear the 
Executive.
146
 In particular, these judges are appointed for life.
147
 In addition, it has already 
happened that judges “veered from the philosophy of the appointing president or were asked 
to decide new and unpredictable issues”.148 The fact that they did is all the more known, 
since the confirmation procedure takes place after televised hearings and public debate by 
and at the Senate, which often sparks the attention of the public.
149
  
However, the situation is different with regard to the Court of Justice. First, judges at the 
Court are appointed for a renewable mandate, so that it could not be renewed for political 
reasons. Second, it is impossible for the public to know if the judges veered from the 
philosophy of the appointing Member State, since candidates’ answers during the selection 
procedure are not public.  
It might still be objected that the rejection of political appointments is not as clear for 
ordinary judges as it is for judges of the highest Courts. Let us take the example of the 
Belgian Constitutional Court, where half judges are former parliamentarians and half are 
professional judges. Through this example, I will expose three reasons that explain why the 
theoretical framework I have developed above also applies to the highest Courts, including 
the Court of Justice.  
First, according to the Belgian law, the fact that a judge had participated to the vote of the 
law at stake when he was a deputy or a senator does not constitute in itself a reason for 
objecting, thus to consider him not to appear or to be independent.
150
 As a result, the law and 
the Constitutional Court as well have let some room to consider that there would be a reason 
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for objecting if a judge had not only voted a law, but if he had showed a more important 
commitment in defending it.
151
 This position might be related to the rule established for the 
Court of Justice, which states that “a party may not apply for a change in the composition of 
the Court or of one of its chambers on the grounds of either the nationality of a Judge or the 
absence from the Court or from the chamber of a Judge of the nationality of that party”.152 In 
this regard, appearance of independence calls for a cautious and pragmatic case-by-case 
analysis, rather than for a general and abstract statement.  
Second, the Belgian Constitutional Court is balanced in two respects. First, only half 
judges are former parliamentarians, while the other half are professional judges. In that sense, 
such a composition can be seen as a political choice that constitutes an advantage for the 
Court, which beneficiates from the experience of former parliamentarians while respecting 
the right to be judged by an independent body. In this regard, one should distinguish the 
selection of judges because of the political experience they could bring to a Court and the 
selection of judges for political reasons, which hide suspicious motivations and raise 
suspicion. Second, judges are all appointed for a long life term. In this regard, the 
composition of a Court such as the one of the Belgian Constitutional Court should present 
some advantages for it and the judges should beneficiate from a strong statute in order to 
respect the principle of appearance of independence. 
Third, it is the Belgian law that establishes the manner of appointment of the judges of the 
Belgian Constitutional Court. As a consequence, everyone knows that some of these judges 
have been appointed due to their political past. In this regard, the composition of a Court such 
as the one of the Belgian Constitutional Court should certainly not be secretly influenced by 
political choices. Secrecy is the worst enemy of confidence.  
It then turns out that there is a link between appearance of independence and the selection 
procedure of judges. In particular, an opaque and/or subjective a selection procedure is likely 
to generate doubts on the independence of the judges and then to reduce public confidence in 
                                                 
151
 C.A. nos. 35/94 and 36/94, 10 May 1994, §B.4. See in this sense: Verdussen, M. (2012), Justice 
constitutionnelle (Brussels: Larcier), p. 344 and Uyttendaele, M. (2005), Précis de droit constitutionnel belge, 
(Brussels: Bruylant), p. 564 and 566. 
152
 Consolidated version on the statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Art. 17(4). 
  
 
  29 
 
 
them. As a result, such a selection procedure would reduce the legitimacy of the judges.
153
A 
selection procedure should then be organized in such a way that it would remove any 
ambiguity regarding the independence of the judges.
154
  
5. How judges are supposed to be selected to protect their appearance of 
independence? 
No one can be inside the mind of a judge. As a result, considering a judge to be 
independent before he had made his decision requires taking appearance into account. It is 
then necessary to create an institutional context that could generate public confidence in the 
judges.
155
 This institutional context consists in particular in a selection procedure that takes 
into account the criteria affecting the public perception of the judge. 
The Venice Commission has recognized that one could not pretend to establish a single 
selection model that would guarantee the full independence of the judiciary.
156
 In the same 
vein, the European Court of Human Rights has judged that it is not up to the Court to say to 
the States how they must organize themselves in order to comply with article 6 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.
157
 Nevertheless, the Council of Europe has 
recommended a reference model for the selection of judges in its recommendation (94)12. 
This recommendation applies to all persons exercising judicial functions, including those 
dealing with constitutional matters.
158
 The Venice Commission refers to this model.
159
 The 
European Court of Human Rights refers to the Venice Commission and to the European 
Charter on the Statute of Judges.
160
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The selection model recommended by the Council of Europe is built on two axes: the 
body in charge of the selection and the selection criteria. Ideally, both of these aspects should 
be combined. However, if the first one is not realized, the second one should be respected in 
any case. 
First, the Recommendation (94)12 shows a preference for a judicial council. This council 
should be independent of the government. According to the Recommendation, its 
independence could be safeguarded if, for example, the judiciary selected its members and if 
the council could decide itself on its procedural rules.  
A major concern with such a model would be not to leave the power of appointing judges 
to a body exclusively composed of lawyers, because this could lead to corporatism: a social 
group – the lawyers – could get a monopolistic representation of their interest and prevail the 
interest of their cast to the public interest.
161
 They could capture a field of public policy and 
then government powers
162
 while they would not have been elected and their legitimacy 
might be discussed. For this reason, corporatism creates defiance in a pluralistic democracy, 
while the purpose of rethinking judicial selection is to increase public confidence. Moreover, 
in modern democracy, all the political system is organized around checks and balances. A 
selection body that would escape to this system would then clearly not be welcome.  
In this light, a model that would promote appearance of independence of the judges 
should strike the right balance between a political and a corporatist judicial selection. In this 
view, an independent body composed of lawyers and elected representatives would be 
particularly suitable. So might also be an independent selection body exclusively composed 
of lawyers that would give a non-binding opinion to the governement.
163
  
Second, the Recommendation (94)12 suggests that every selection procedure of the 
judges should be based on objectivity and transparency.
164
In this regard, the purpose of any 
selection procedure should consist in trying to choose in the most transparent manner the best 
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judge who could be absolutely competent and appreciate cases with full independence.
165
 The 
European Union totally shares these views on the selection criteria. For instance, the 
European Commission has particularly criticized Bulgaria for the lack of objectivity and 
transparency in the appointment of its important judges. It has then recommended to Bulgaria 
to “make transparency, objectivity and integrity the top priority in appraisals, promotions, 
appointments and disciplinary decisions for the judiciary”.166 Finally, the European Court of 
Human Rights does also look, in particular, at the objectivity of the selection criteria.
167
 
 With regard to objectivity, the Consultative Council of European Judges recommends 
that the selection authority introduce, publish and give effect to objective criteria.
168
 In 
particular, according to the Council of Europe, the selection should be based on merit, having 
regard to qualifications, integrity, ability and efficiency.  
With regard to transparency, a transparent selection procedure is highly recommended.
169
 
I see mainly three reasons for this. First, in a certain perspective, determining what is a “good 
judge” always constitutes a political assumption. In this regard, “no matter how the 
[selection procedure of the judges] is constructed it always has a political dimension”.170 In 
that light, and surely when there is a political composition of the Court, the only choice of the 
public is between “a process in which the politics is open, and possesses some degree of 
balance or a system in which political power and influence is masked, unacknowledged, and 
unilateral”.171 Second, as a democratic institution, judges must be accountable to the public. 
Naturally, no accountability is possible in the absence of information.
172
 Since there cannot 
be information without transparency, transparency is crucial in order to allow accountability. 
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Third, transparency is a solution to exaggeration. Selection procedures built on political 
reasons, such as the one exposed in the previous section (e.g. the political choice of France 
and Germany highlighted by Alter), might be rare from an academic and scientific point of 
view, but they left room for exaggeration when they are opaque. Indeed, if the public comes 
to know that two judges out of twenty eight have been selected for political reasons, and if it 
does not know how the other judges have been selected, then how could it not become 
suspicious regarding the independence of all of the judges? On the contrary, if the selection 
procedure is transparent, this situation will not be exaggerated, because everyone would 
know that politicized selections are limited to only two cases. In that sense, the more the 
selection procedure is transparent, the more it ensures the appearance of independence of the 
judges.
173
 
The reference model recommended by the Council of Europe has merits and limits.  
The most noticeable merit of this model is to generate public confidence in the judges. 
First, the requirement of an independent selection body leads to a selection perceived as an 
expertise. People can trust this body because it is only designed to proceed to a selection 
providing its expertise, without any interest in the choices made. Second, the requirement of 
objective selection criteria allow people to think that the selected candidate is the best one, 
the one who had to be selected. Third, as exposed above, transparency is necessary in order to 
create confidence.
174
 In this regard, transparency is the modern extension of publicity,
175
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which is essential to maintain public confidence.
176
 It is designed “to illuminate the mysteries 
and to thwart [the] obsession with secrecy”177 of the power, which are the worst enemies of 
public confidence. However, it should be borne in mind that transparency should not be 
understood as nudity or as an opportunity for voyeurism. In this regard, a transparent 
selection procedure should respect and protect the privacy of the candidates. As a result, their 
identity might be kept secret.
178
 In my opinion, transparency in the selection procedure does 
not necessarily have to apply to the identity and the application file of the candidates, but 
rather to the assessment of the selection criteria. Not only should the public know what are 
the selection criteria of the judges, but is should also know how they are applied concretely. 
Otherwise, the objectivity of the selection criteria might be purely superficial.  
The most noticeable limit of the reference model recommended by the Council of Europe 
is that it does not constitute an absolute and perfect guarantee. First, objective and transparent 
procedures can always be diverted to become pure illusions. Specific interests can also 
capture an independent selection body. As a consequence, the real implementation of this 
model and the respect of its requirements should always be controlled. The absence of a 
perfect model should not lead to abandon this one. There comes a time when it is necessary 
to apply the best possible solution. The rest necessarily relies on confidence, which is a 
“human bet”.179 Second, “the existence of an objective appointments procedure independent 
of executive influence can provide some assurance about the quality of a candidate for 
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judicial office”.180 However, the model of the Council of Europe does not necessarily lead to 
the selection of the best candidate. Still, this is not the purpose of the selection procedure in 
the context of this dissertation. 
6. European Courts dealing with appearance of independence 
According to both the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, any 
reasonable doubt regarding the independence of the judges must be dispelled in the mind of 
individuals. The criterion of a reasonable doubt means that any other person in the same 
situation as the party at stake would feel the same doubt. This involves that the doubt should 
rely on some objective criteria. In that sense, subjective doubts are determining only if they 
rely on “elements of verifiable facts and law”.181 
I will now address two questions. First, from whose perspective can a doubt be 
considered to be reasonable (a)? Second, in which concrete conditions does the Court 
consider that there is such a reasonable doubt (b)? 
a. From which perspective does one have to appreciate the reasonable doubt? 
Since the problematic doubt must be reasonable, it must be appreciated from the point of 
view of a reasonable person, that is to say a “a fair minded observer acting reasonably”.182 
The reasonableness of this person means that his doubt must be based on some objectivity. 
According to the European Court of Human Rights, “the standpoint of the accused is 
important without being decisive. What is decisive is whether his doubts can be held to be 
objectively justified”.183 However, it should be borne in mind that this objectivity does not 
mean completeness. The reasonable person cannot be conceived as a person who knows 
everything, because there would not be any problem of appearance in such a case. Indeed, the 
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appearance of independence of a judge is evaluated before he had made his decision. This 
involves that the party at stake has only partial information. He will only have all the 
information once the decision will have been made.  
b. When do the European judges consider a doubt to be reasonable? 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I will only focus on the situations in which a 
reasonable doubt on the independence of a judge is raised because of the way he has been 
selected. In this regard, three kinds of situations should be distinguished. Schematically, these 
are the identity of the authority that has selected the judge, the considerations that guide the 
reasoning of the judge, and the positioning of the judge regarding the parties to the hearings.  
First, the identity of the body that appointed the judge does not raise a reasonable doubt 
in itself, but it raises such a doubt when the judge does not benefit from a strong statute that 
ensures his independence. In this regard, both the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Court of Justice have judged that the appointment of a judge by the executive does not raise a 
reasonable doubt regarding his appearance of independence.
184
 However, the rationale for 
this decision is different in the case law of these Courts.  
According to the European Court of Human Rights, the appointment of a judge by the 
executive does not affect its independence as long as the statute of the judge “clearly shows 
that, once he is appointed, he is not under any pressure, he does not receive any instructions 
from the executive, and he works independently”.185 In that light, the European Court of 
Human Rights has considered that there is no reasonable doubt when there is no contact 
between a Minister and a judge, so that one could not be confused with the other.
186
 On the 
contrary, there is a reasonable doubt when there is a hierarchical subordination between a 
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Minister and a judge.
187
 In such a case, judges could not appear anymore to be a third 
party.
188
 According to the European Court of Human Rights, “such a situation seriously 
affects the confidence which the courts must inspire in a democratic society”.189  
The justification of the Court of Justice is much more limited. It is based on two criteria 
and one general observation.
190
 The first criterion addresses the statute of the judge. With 
regard to this criterion, the Court has only considered that the judge had been appointed for a 
specific term. The second criterion addresses the competences of the judge. In this regard, the 
Court has considered that judges were selected from among persons with a certain and 
satisfying experience. Finally, the Court of Justice has observed that judicial appointments by 
Ministers are a common practice in several Member States. 
It then turns out that the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice have a 
different approach. On the one hand, the European Court of Human Rights does not take the 
competences of the judges into account and has adopted a high standard: the appointment of a 
judge by the executive affects its independence if his statute does not clearly show that he is 
independent. On the other hand, the Court of Justice seems to adopt a much lower standard 
when judges are competent. In that light, and in the context of the appearance of 
independence of the judges regarding the manner of their appointment, the European Court of 
Human Rights seems to be more interested in the independence of the judges than in their 
competences, while the Court of Justice seems to be more interested in their competences 
than in their independence. This appears to support the idea that the issue of competences 
appears to override the issue of appearances in the European Union Law village. 
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Second, there is a reasonable doubt when one could fear that the judge comes to the case 
with a predetermined idea of the solution.
191
 In this respect, a judge cannot appear to have 
any interest in the case.
192
 In particular, he cannot appear to have an opposite interest to the 
one of the party at stake.
193
 According to the Court of Justice and to the Court of Human 
Rights, this is because such a situation generates legitimate grounds for suspecting that the 
balance of the interests concerned is upset.
194
 Since the judge has to be neutral, he has to keep 
an equal distance with the interests at stake. If a judge appears to have any interest and a 
fortiori an opposite interest to the one of a party, he does not respect this distance and raises a 
reasonable doubt regarding his appearance of independence.  
Third, there is a reasonable doubt when the judge can be assimilated to one of the parties 
at stake
195
 or to an interest group, unless his presence constitutes an advantage to render 
justice.  
A tribunal can be assimilated to one of the parties at stake, for instance, when it is 
composed of military officers while it is charged with offences relating to propaganda against 
military service.
196
 Another example is the case of a tribunal that has to judge over an action 
in liability against itself, while the indemnity would be charged on its budget.
197
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110/98 Gabalfrisa e.a. [2000] ECR 1-01577, §39-40). The European Court of Human Rights has a similar 
approach. See Savino and others v. Italy, nos. 17214/05, 20329/05 and 42113/04, ECHR, §104).  
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 Ergin v. Turkey, no. 47533/99, ECHR, 2006-VI, §54. 
197
 Mihalkov v. Bulgaria, no. 67719/01, ECHR, 2008, §47-48. 
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The fact that some of the judges have a clear affiliation (e.g. interest groups 
representatives) does not constitute a proof of partiality in itself.
198
 According to the 
European Court of Human Rights, their presence in a tribunal often constitutes an advantage 
to render justice.
199
 Therefore, in my opinion, it is only when the presence of judges with a 
clear affiliation in a tribunal constitutes an advantage for this tribunal to render justice that it 
does not raise a reasonable doubt. In that light, the presence of workers and employers 
representative in a Labour Court would not raise a reasonable doubt regarding their 
appearance of independence, while the presence of a representative of the Minister in a Court 
such as the Court of Justice would necessarily generate such doubts. 
These developments call for two general remarks to be made.  
First, according to the European Court of Human Rights, the existence of a reasonable 
doubt regarding the appearance of independence of some judges generates a reasonable 
doubt towards the entire tribunal.
200
 This may be explained because the parties cannot trust 
one of the judges and they do not know how he could influence the others.
201
 However, the 
Court of Justice does not follow the same logic. It has rather decided that the reasonable 
doubt was established when all or at least the majority of the tribunal generates it.
202
  
Second, with regard to the guarantees of independence, the European Court of Human 
Rights is more interested in what is done in reality than to what is supposed to be in theory. 
In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights does even consider guarantees that are 
not written anywhere but that can be observed in practice as satisfactory.
203
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 Luka v. Romania, no. 34197/02, ECHR, 2009, §41. 
199
 Luka v. Romania, no. 34197/02, ECHR, 2009, §42. 
200
 Langborger v. Sweden, no. 11179/84, ECHR, 1989, §35; Sadak and others v. Turkey, nos. 29900/96, 
29901/96, 29902/96 and 29903/96, ECHR, 2001, §39. 
201
 The European Court of Human Rights gives a great importance to the deliberate. As a matter of fact, it 
considers that the presence at the deliberate of someone who has defended a certain position during the hearings 
constitutes a lack of independence of the tribunal, even if this person does not have a deliberative or a 
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v. Portugal [GC], no. 15764/89, ECHR, 1996, §32). So what is important is the participation to the deliberate, 
not the influence on it (Castellino v. Belgium, no. 504/08, ECHR, 2013, §47). 
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 Case C-506/04 Wilson [2006] ECR I-08613, §57. 
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 Sacilor Lormines v. France, no. 65411/01, ECHR, 2006, §65. 
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As a conclusion, it turns out that a selection procedure cannot lead to abandon the choice 
of a judge to an interested party if the judge does not beneficiate from a strong statute that 
clearly shows his independence. A selection procedure can also not lead to choose a judge 
who can appear to have an interest in the case, and a fortiori, who have an opposite interest to 
the one of the parties or who can appear to be assimilated to a specific party. 
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II 
SELECTING JUDGES OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the selection procedure of the judges of the Court of Justice is 
established in article 19(2) TEU and developed in article 253 and 255 TFEU. The procedure 
is basically organized in three stages. First, Member States select their candidates. Afterwards, 
they submit these candidates to a panel, which gives a non-binding opinion on their 
suitability.
204
 This panel is usually but not officially called the “255 Committee” because of 
the article of the TFEU that establishes it. Finally, candidates are appointed by common 
accord of the governments of the Member States. I will then analyse the selection procedure 
following these three stages, one after the other. 
1. The selection procedure at the national level 
According to article 253 TFEU, Member States have to respect only two conditions when 
they select their candidates for the Court of Justice. They must choose candidates “from 
persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are 
jurisconsults of recognised competence”.205 There is no further prescription or any kind of 
regulation of the conditions established by the Member States for the selection procedure at 
the national level.
206
 As a result, it is up to each Member State to decide of the organization 
of their selection procedure, as long as it fulfils the two criteria established by the Treaty. For 
this reason, selection can be very different from one Member State to another.
207
 
                                                 
204
 The creation of such a panel had already been suggested by the Due Group in order “to verify the legal 
competence of candidates” (Working Party on the Future of the European Communities Court System (2000), 
Report, p. 51. See also Sauvé, J.-M., “Le rôle du Comité 255 dans la sélection du juge de l’Union”, op. cit., p. 
104). For another similar suggestion, see Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice (2003), Final Report, CONV 
636/03, p. 2, §6. 
205
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] O.J. C 115/47, Art. 253. 
206
 Sauvé, J.-M., “La sélection des juges de l’Union européenne : la pratique du comité de l’article 255”, op. cit., 
p. 4. 
207
 See Malenovski, J., op. cit., p. 134-135. Malenovski highlights that, since national selection procedures are 
not equivalent, they are not about to lead to the selection of judges of an equivalent quality, which affects the 
quality of the Court of Justice. As explained below, the creation of the 255 Committee does not guarantee such 
an equivalence.  
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Surely, the 255 Committee plays the role of a filter in the selection procedure of the 
judges of the Court of Justice. Since its creation, Member States are no longer the only one to 
appreciate the independence of their candidates.
208
 However, despite the creation of the 255 
Committee, it is still necessary to analyse the selection procedure at the national level. This is 
mainly because the 255 Committee has to face two limits in its task. I do not include the non-
binding aspect of the Committee’s opinions in these limits. Although this might seem to be 
an important limit in theory, it is not the case in practice, since Member States always follow 
the opinion of the Committee.
209
  
The first limit that the 255 Committee has to face concerns the nature of its opinions. The 
Committee only gives “an opinion on candidates' suitability to perform the duties of 
Judge”. 210  Its role is limited to say if the candidate fits or not the function. 211  As a 
consequence, the 255 Committee does only ensure that the minimum requirements are met, 
not the maximum.  
The second limit that the 255 Committee has to face is that it cannot choose a candidate 
among several one.
212
 The Committee cannot “rank multiple applications or privilege one 
profile at the expense of another”213. As a consequence, the Committee considers that “the 
fundamental responsibility in the appointment of Judges […] of the Court of Justice […] lies 
with the Member States who, in particular, must propose the best candidates, taking into 
account the criteria laid down by Articles 253, 254 and 255 TFEU”.214  
With regard to these limits, it appears that the national selection procedure plays a 
primary role in the selection of the judges of the Court of Justice since, from a certain 
                                                 
208
 Sauvé, J.-M., “La sélection des juges de l’Union européenne : la pratique du comité de l’article 255”, op. cit., 
p. 1. 
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 See below. 
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 Sauvé, J.-M. (2012), Second Activity Report of the Panel Provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, 5091/13, p. 5 (I emphasize).  
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 Sauvé, J.-M., “Le rôle du Comité 255 dans la sélection du juge de l’Union”, op. cit., p. 115. 
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 Sauvé, J.-M., Second Activity Report of the Panel Provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, op. cit., p. 7. 
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 Sauvé, J.-M., “Le rôle du Comité 255 dans la sélection du juge de l’Union”, op. cit., p. 115. 
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 Sauvé, J.-M., Second Activity Report of the Panel Provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, op. cit., p. 7. Note that this observation of the 255 Committee is all the 
more interesting considering that, according to the wording of article 253 TFEU, judges of the Court of Justice 
should be chosen among the best, and not necessarily be the best, as the Committee seems to interpret it. 
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perspective, the selection is pre-established at this stage. In addition, since the national 
selection procedures are freely organized by the Member States, their variety makes all the 
more important to analyse them. 
I will now analyse the selection procedures in the United Kingdom (a), France (b) and 
Belgium (c) through a common analysis grid based on seven points. First, what is the national 
legal basis for the selection procedure? Second, how is the vacancy advertised? Third, who 
can participate to the selection procedure? Four, what are the selection criteria, which are 
established in addition to those provided by the Treaty? Five, who is the selection committee? 
Six, what are its powers? Seven, what are the roles of the government, the judiciary, and the 
judges of the Court of Justice in the procedure? 
a. The selection procedure in the United Kingdom 
Since the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, judicial appointments in the United 
Kingdom are submitted to the recommendation of an independent judicial appointment 
Commission.
215
 This procedure is not compulsory regarding the selection of candidates for 
the Court of Justice. However, the Lord Chancellor can request the advice of the Commission 
on appointments that are not listed in the Act.
216
 This is what has been done for the selection 
of the United Kingdom’s candidate for the Court of Justice.  
The vacancy is publicly and broadly advertised through many official websites such as 
the one of the Judicial Appointment Commission
217
, but also in the press. It is open to anyone 
who is able to demonstrate compliance with the agreed eligibility criteria.  
The selection criteria are publicly known. They are as follows:  
“Excellent understanding and experience of EU law, including the wider impact of 
the ECJ’s judgments on Member States; Good operational level of French; Excellent 
                                                 
215
 See Lord Mance (2014), “The Independence of Judges”, in N. A. Engstad, A. L. Frøseth, and B. Tønder 
(eds.), The Independence of Judges, (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing), p. 60-62. 
216
 Dumbrovsky, T., Petkova, B., and Van Der Sluis, M. (2014), “Judicial Appointments: The Article 255 TFEU 
Advisory Panel and Selection Procedures in the Member States”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 51, p. 17-
18. 
217
 In particular, the vacancy is advertised through the websites of the three territorial appointments bodies: the 
Judicial Appointments Commission for England & Wales, the Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, and 
the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission. See for example: http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk.  
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intellectual ability and drafting skills; Experience of legal practice; Good organisational 
and case management skills, including an ability to effectively   delegate to, and work 
with, a support team at the Court; Excellent interpersonal skills including an ability to 
communicate effectively and   persuasively with colleagues in the Court”.218  
The preferred candidate is selected on merit, based upon the selection criteria. A balance 
has also often but not systematically been made in the past between a Scottish judge for the 
Court of Justice and an English judge for the General Court.  
An independent selection panel composed of seven members has been appointed to 
consider the applications received in order to identify the preferred candidate. The current lay 
chair of the Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland chairs the panel.
219
 The other members 
are two members of the senior United Kingdom judiciary, two senior Government legal 
advisors and two legal academics.
220
   
The panel considers all applications through two stages. First, all candidates must fill in a 
questionnaire and collect references. Second, they must attend an interview with the panel. 
The panel then makes a recommendation to the Lord Chancellor, who in turn formally advise 
the Foreign Secretary of the preferred candidate. At the end of the day, it is the Foreign 
Secretary who decides on the candidate who will be proposed to the 255 Committee. For the 
moment, it has followed the advice of the panel. So, even if the panel is only an advisory 
organ, its role in the final selection is important.
221
  
The Government intervenes in the selection procedure in three respects: it agrees the 
creation of the panel, its membership, and it considers the best candidate identified by the 
panel.
222
 
Judges are also involved in the selection procedure. Indeed, “all of the Chief Justices of 
the UK, including the President of the UK Supreme Court, are consulted on the membership 
                                                 
218
 Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the European Union, “Questionnaire of the 
United Kingdom”, Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and to the European Court of Human Rights, p. 3. 
219
 “Questionnaire of the United Kingdom”, p. 4. 
220
 “Questionnaire of the United Kingdom”, p. 4. 
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 Dumbrovsky, T., et al., op. cit., p. 17-18. 
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of the selection panel and on the name of the preferred candidate as and when identified”.223 
In the same vein, the then sitting United Kingdom’s judge to the Court of Justice assist the 
selection panel in identifying the most meritorious candidate for the post by providing a 
background presentation on the work of the Court, in order to make sure the panel knows 
what is expected from a judge at the Court of Justice.
224
   
b. The selection procedure in France 
In France, the selection procedure does not lie in any legal text, but it relies on a thirty 
years old tradition. According to this tradition, the post of judge at the Court of Justice is 
attributed to a judge of the Council of State, while the post of advocate general goes to a 
judge chosen among the judicial order.
225
 As a logical consequence of such a selection 
procedure, there is no public advertising of the vacancy. Only members of the Council of 
State are taken into account for the selection. 
All the selection procedure is decided internally and the choice made is not publicly 
justified. As a result, the selection criteria are absolutely unknown.  
The Vice-President of the Council of State and the president of the litigation section
226
 
choose the candidate. The role of the Council of State in this selection procedure can be 
explained regarding the dual role it plays in France: it is not only the judge of the 
administration, but also the government adviser. In that sense, the government used to ask the 
Council opinion before proceeding to appointments. 
In practice, the government automatically proposes the candidate chosen by the Council 
of State, because it considers the choice of the Council of State to be an exclusive prerogative. 
For this reason, the government does not interfere in the membership of the selection panel, 
neither in the consideration of the submitted candidate. In this regard, the power of the 
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224
 “Questionnaire of the United Kingdom”, p. 6. 
225
 Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the European Union, “Questionnaire of France”, 
Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, to the Court of Justice of the European Union and to the 
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Council of State can be seen to be an indirect proposition of the candidate to the 255 
Committee through the government that will formally submit his candidature.
227
 
c. The selection procedure in Belgium  
In Belgium, the selection procedure does not lie in any legal text, nor does it rely on any 
practice. Still, the selection procedure seems to rely on a practice, which I will describe as 
follows.  
With regard to the advertising of the vacancy, it is not public.  
With regard to the selection criteria, the answer is the same. Here again, since the choice 
of the candidate is not justified, the selection criteria cannot be guessed. However, when the 
government announces the identity of the selected candidate to the public, it presents this 
candidate in such a way that one might discover why he has been chosen. Yet, there are two 
limits to this approach. First, the government does surely highlight the qualities of the 
candidate it has selected, but it is impossible to know if this candidate has been selected 
because of these qualities, or if he has been selected for other reasons, his qualities being 
highlighted afterwards in order to hide the real rationale of his selection. Second, even if one 
could know why a candidate has been selected, this would not tell him why others have not 
been selected. Still, the criteria that seem to be found in the communications of the 
government are all related to the skills of the selected candidate. In this regard, references are 
especially made to the degrees and the academic and professional experience of the candidate, 
in particular to its publications and teaching activities.
228
 When it comes to decide of the 
renewal of a mandate, the government reduces the elements of its communication to the 
minimum. One can only find an allusion in these communications to the quality of the work 
made by the judge, which might justifies the renewal of his mandate. This allusion has 
already been expressed by highlighting that the colleagues of the judge at stake have elected 
                                                 
227
 It is the Minister of Justice who selects the advocate general. 
228
 Gouvernement fédéral belge (2003), Communication - Nominations auprès de la Cour de Justice et du 
Tribunal de première instance des communautés européennes, www.presscenter.org 
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him president of the chamber.
229
 In any case, there is no trace of any justification with regard 
to the non-renewal of the mandate of a judge.  
In addition, since Belgium is composed of two linguistic communities (Dutch-speaking in 
the north and French-speaking in the south), everything in this country is organized on the 
idea of a balancing between their representativeness. This approach is perceived as a matter 
of mutual respect. For this reason, if the judge of the Court of Justice is Dutch-speaking, the 
advocate general will be French-speaking, and vice-versa. However, the balancing can also 
be made between the judge of the Court of Justice on the one hand, and the advocate general, 
the judge of the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal. In this regard, the post of judge 
at the Court of Justice looks to be considered to be the most important.
230
 Finally, elements 
related to the representativeness of both linguistic communities are also taken into account 
when it comes to select a judge among one of them. In this regard, a candidate from one 
community is advantaged if he can demonstrate links that bring him closer to the other 
community.
231
  
In practice, it is the Minister of Justice who seeks to find the Belgian candidate for the 
Court of Justice. The Minister asks to the national Superior Council of Justice, to the 
Presidents of the Council of State and the Court of Cassation and to deans of universities to 
suggest him some names.
232
 It has also happened that the Minister consults the then sitting 
Belgian Judge at the Court of Justice to the same end. Afterwards, candidates are asked 
whether they are interested to be judges at the Court of Justice. Next, they meet the Ministers 
of Justice and Foreign affairs. This appointment might be purely formal, since the decision 
seems to already have been taken before. As a matter of fact, the proposition of a candidate 
for the post of judge at the Court of Justice depends on intense political discussions and 
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 Conseil des Ministres (2008), Communication - Prolongation du mandat du juge belge à la Cour de Justice 
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negotiations regarding the distribution of the mandates, especially when it comes to constitute 
the federal government.
233
 As a consequence, candidates need to be supported by political 
parties in order to have a chance of obtaining the post.
234
Finally, the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs jointly propose a candidate to the 
Council of Ministers, which has in turn to propose the finally selected candidate to the 255 
Committee.  
2. The 255 Committee  
The 255 Committee has been established by the Treaty of Lisbon. It started to work in 
March 2010, immediately after the European Union has determined the conditions of its 
functioning and has appointed its first members.
235
 
The 255 Committee is composed of seven members appointed for four years.
236
 These 
members are “chosen from among former members of the Court of Justice and the General 
Court, members of national supreme courts and lawyers of recognised competence, one of 
whom shall be proposed by the European Parliament”.237 In this regard, the composition of 
the 255 Committee appears to have been smartly determined for three reasons.  
First, the current Committee is mostly composed of members of the national highest 
Courts. Since there is no judicial remedy under the national law against the decisions of these 
Courts, they have the obligation to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary 
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ruling.
238
 Accordingly, these Courts do particularly have to trust the Court of Justice. From 
this point of view, one might consider that members of the 255 Committee who belong to the 
national highest Courts underpin and nurture the confidence inspired by the judges of the 
Court of Justice when they show themselves that they trust them through the selection 
procedure.  
Second, the former judges of the European Court of Justice present in the Committee can 
inform members of national Supreme Courts on the requirements of the work at the Court.  
Third, given its composition, the 255 Committee escapes to national governments 
considerations and to any politicization. 
With regard to the selection criteria, the Treaty does only establish two of them: 
competence and independence.
239
 These criteria are exhaustive. However, the 255 Committee 
has considered that they “could be more clearly and precisely explained”.240 According to 
the Committee, it does not invent anything in doing so. Yet, adopting criteria in order to 
evaluate the suitability of a candidate implies defining this suitability, which is, in a certain 
perspective, a political act.
241
 Still, the six criteria taken into account by the 255 Committee in 
assessing the suitability of the candidates are as follows: “the candidate's legal expertise, 
professional experience, ability to perform the duties of a Judge, their impartiality and 
independence being beyond doubt, language skills and aptitude for working as part of a team 
in an international environment in which several legal systems are represented”.242 This 
raises an interesting question. Since Member States always follow the opinion of the 255 
Committee, it is their interest to adopt the same selection criteria than the one established by 
the Committee in order to ensure that they will receive a favourable opinion and that their 
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candidate will be appointed. The 255 Committee is well aware that its opinions have a 
“deterrence and virtuous effect on the selection by the Member States of the fittest 
candidates”.243 As a result, the Committee does also perfectly know that it “can contribute to 
guide the governments in their choice of candidates, as well as it can orientate their 
definition of the national selection procedure”.244 This seems to be happening in practice.245 
National selection procedures in Finland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic have already 
evaluated towards more transparency through public call for applications and objectivity 
through advisory boards. In the Czech Republic, the new selection procedure has clearly been 
set up in 2011 in response to opinions of the Panel.
246
 In this light, although it is too early to 
say if the 255 Committee’s opinions influence the selection procedure in the United Kingdom, 
France and Belgium,
247
 this would be a fascinating question for the next years and one should 
monitor with great attention the evolution of the selection procedure of the judges of the 
Court of Justice in these Member States and in the European Union more generally.  
The 255 Committee is clearly interested in the functioning of the national selection 
procedure. However, its position is ambiguous. On the one hand, according to its first report, 
the 255 Committee takes into account the selection criteria of the national procedures in order 
to “support” its assessment of the candidate and, in particular, of his independence.248 First, 
the Committee requires Member States to explain to it the “essential reasons why it chose the 
proposed candidate”. 249  Second, the Committee considers how the candidate has been 
selected at the national level. This includes considerations such as transparency, objectivity, 
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and selection committee
250
. On the other hand, in its last report, the 255 Committee has 
considered that: 
“ […] The method for selecting the candidate chosen at national level may not be 
prejudicial to him or her. In particular, the lack of a procedure enabling candidates' 
merits to be assessed in an independent and objective manner may not in itself constitute 
a handicap. It would, after all, be illogical to disadvantage candidates whose merits are 
to be assessed on the grounds of a selection process over which they have no control. 
Furthermore, the panel is aware that the selection procedure is the sole responsibility of 
Member States and is not framed by the TFEU. As a result, the panel naturally gave 
favourable opinions on suitable candidatures within the meaning of the Treaty, even in 
the absence of public call for applications or an independent national procedure for 
assessing merits”251. 
What seems to be a subsequent development of the Committee’s position is surprising for 
four reasons. First, if the 255 Committee does not take into account in its evaluation the way 
national selections procedures are organized, then why does it want to know how they work? 
Second, the Committee has considered that any aspect of the selection procedure can raise a 
doubt on the independence of a candidate.
252
 Then why would it not consider the functioning 
of the national selection procedure in this respect? Three, while stating that the national 
selection procedure cannot constitute an advantage or a disadvantage for a candidate, the 255 
Committee does also state that a strong national selection procedure can dispel its doubts on a 
candidate.
253
 In this respect, the position of the Committee does not look consistent. Let us 
illustrate this point by taking the example of two equal candidates, that is to say two persons 
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submitting the exact same application file but who have been selected through different 
selection procedures. If A has been selected through a weak procedure and B through a 
strong procedure (that is, among other things, an objective and transparent procedure), B will 
have an advantage on A. Four, the Treaty requires candidates to be independent beyond doubt. 
In that light, the 255 Committee cannot be followed when it considers that “the selection 
procedure is the sole responsibility of Member States and is not framed by the TFEU”.254 
The 255 Committee has to ensure the independence beyond doubt of the judges of the Court 
of Justice. Given the determining importance of the national selection procedure in this 
regard, the Committee cannot ignore it. It is not about disadvantaging candidates for 
something they are not responsible for. It is about guaranteeing the independence of the 
judges of the Court of Justice, as the Treaty requires it. 
Since the beginning of its work, the 255 Committee has provided 67 opinions, 32 of them 
being candidatures for a first term.
255
 7 of these 32 opinions were unfavourable, so that 22% 
of the Committee’s opinions on candidatures for a first term are unfavourable.256 According 
to its reports, it seems that the 255 Committee has not yet delivered an unfavourable opinion 
because it would have had some doubts regarding the independence of a candidate. 
Nevertheless, the Committee has delivered unfavourable opinions when a candidate had not 
enough experience or too limited competences in European Union law.
257
 Such grounds raise 
some doubts on the reasons that led to select these candidates. How is it that a Member State 
sent a candidate to sit on the Court of Justice while he is not enough experience and/or 
competences? This does not necessarily means that such a candidate has been selected for 
political reasons but it raises doubts in that sense. 
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The deliberations of the 255 Committee take place in camera.
258
 There are no rules with 
regard to the way the Committee has to decide of its opinions. There is no clear answer to this 
question. Until now, it seems that the Committee has nearly always found a way to reach a 
consensus.
259
 Exceptionally, the absence of consensus has been reflected in the wording and 
the reasoning of the Committee’s opinion. 
Finally, the 255 Committee has interpreted the rules of its functioning in such a way that 
it considers that its opinions should not be public. This interpretation is twofold.
260
 First, 
according to the operating rules of the Committee, the Committee deliberates in camera and it 
only forwards its opinions to the Representatives of the Member States for the selection 
procedure.
261
 Second, “the institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure 
would undermine the protection of […] privacy and the integrity of the individual […]”.262  
3. The appointment by the Member States 
At the end of the day, it is up to the governments of the Member States to appoint the 
candidates by common accord. In theory, the Member States are not bound by the opinion of 
the 255 Committee. However, they have always followed it, so far.
263
 Two reasons explain 
the attitude of the Member States. First, none of them wants to challenge the Committee’s 
opinion. The appointment of a judge to the Court of Justice is a politically sensitive matter. In 
this regard, it is extremely delicate for one Member State to refuse the appointment of the 
judge of another Member State. In this view, the 255 Committee’s opinions constitute an 
umbrella under which Member States find a comfortable refuge: they can all take refuge 
behind the Committee’s opinion without generating any political offense. 264  Second, all 
Member States know the Committee’s opinion and the reason why it has provided an 
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unfavourable opinion. Accordingly, even if a Member State wants to maintain its support for 
its candidate, it is very unlikely that all other Member States would follow it, since the 
Committee’s opinion should have convinced them that this would be inappropriate.265 As a 
matter of fact, Member States have almost always withdrawn their candidate by themselves 
when he had received an unfavourable opinion from the 255 Committee. There is only one 
case in which Member States have observed that no consensus could be reached.
266
 In 
addition, just as unanimity among Member States is required to appoint a judge, unanimity is 
required to go beyond an unfavourable opinion of the Committee, which strengthens its 
opinions.
267
  
As a consequence, it turns out that, by contrast to its theoretical powers, the 255 
Committee has a highly determining role in the selection procedure of the judges of the Court 
of Justice.
 268
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III 
THE SELECTION PROCEDURE OF THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE WITH REGARD 
TO THE CONCEPT OF APPEARANCE OF INDEPENDENCE 
In this last part, I will compare the practice of the selection procedure of the judges of the 
Court of Justice with the theoretical framework developed in the first part, in order to 
determine the impact of this procedure on the appearance of independence of the judges of 
the Court of Justice.  
I will make this comparison through a two-phase approach. I will start by analysing the 
national stage (1) and I will continue with the European stage (2). Again, I will make the 
comparison between theory and practice in both sections through a common analysis grid. In 
this regard, I will systematically start by addressing the existence of an independent selection 
body in the selection procedure at stake. I will then focus on the selection criteria that guide it 
with regard to the requirements of objectivity and transparency. I will then highlight the 
forces and weaknesses of the selection procedure of the judges of the Court of Justice 
regarding their appearance of independence (3). Finally, I will consider if this procedure 
raises a reasonable doubt in this respect (4). 
1. The national stage 
With regard to the existence of an independent selection body, it turns out that such a 
body does not always exist at the national level. In the United Kingdom, the existing 
independent selection body does not really select the candidate. It only suggests the one it 
considers to be the best. Nevertheless, the British government follows its opinion. In France, 
the Council of State can be seen as an independent selection body. Its choice is 
communicated to the French government forwards it to the 255 Committee.  
In addition, the composition of these bodies is different in these two countries. In the 
United Kingdom, besides its President, the panel is equally composed of academics, judges, 
and government legal advisors. Such a composition appears to be rather well balanced 
between objective and representative considerations, especially regarding the way the 
procedure is organized and the fact that, at the end of the day, it is the national government 
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that will proceed to the appointment of the candidate. On the contrary, in France, the 
selection is entirely made by the Council of State and among its own members. As a 
consequence, this “selection body” might look corporatist. This feeling could be all the more 
justified, knowing that there is a strong esprit de corps at the French Council of State, that is 
to say, according to the Oxford dictionary, “a feeling of pride and mutual loyalty shared by 
the members of a group”.269 This is because 80% of the members of the Council of State are 
alumni of the famous Ecole Nationale d’Administration (“ENA”).270 These members join the 
Council of State young and carve out their carer in this institution.
271
 Since the choice of the 
Council of State is not legally binding, the fact that the government appoints the candidate 
might theoretically counterbalance the corporatist aspect of the selection. However, in 
practice, the government automatically and systematically proposes the candidate selected by 
the Council of State.  
Finally, in Belgium, there is no independent selection body at all. The selection is entirely 
made by the executive. The appointment of a judge by the executive does not affect its 
independence as long as the statute of the judge “clearly shows that, once he is appointed, he 
is not under any pressure, he does not receive any instructions from the executive, and he 
works independently”.272 In this regard, the selection of the Belgian candidate by the Belgian 
government is problematic because the statute of the judges of the Court of Justice is not 
strong enough to clearly show that they are not under any pressure. Surely, there is no 
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hierarchical subordination between Ministers and judges
273
 and there is probably no contact 
between them.
274
 However, a major concern regarding the statute of the judges of the Court 
of Justice is their appointment for a renewable period of six years.
275
 This is because one 
could fear that a judge who would not satisfy his Member State would not be renewed.
276
 
This fear is all the more justified considering that it has already happen that judges of the 
Court of Justice have not been reappointed for political reasons.
277
 
With regard to the selection criteria, the situation is also very different from one of the 
analysed Member States to another. In the United Kingdom, the selection procedure is 
transparent and based on objective criteria. However, transparency is limited to the 
advertising of the vacancy.
278
 This limitation of transparency does also limit the appearance 
of objectivity of the selection criteria. Indeed, the recommendation of the selection body is 
not published.
279
 Again, I do not claim that it should be published. I rather claim that one 
could not totally be confident in the objectivity of a selection procedure if one does not know 
how the objective criteria are applied. In France, the procedure is not transparent at all. As a 
result, nothing can be known regarding the selection criteria. Nevertheless, the selection is 
made by judges among judges of one of the French Supreme Courts, the prestigious Council 
of State. In this regard, the selection of a judge who should appear to be independent is 
supposed to be made among judges who already offer this guarantee by judges who offer it as 
well. In Belgium, the selection procedure is not transparent at all. The selection is the result 
of a political agreement and it can hardly be seen to be objective. 
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2. The European stage 
With regard to the existence of an independent selection body, it is incarnated in the 255 
Committee.
280
 Given the limits the Committee has to face in its mission – that is giving an 
opinion on the suitability of one candidate and no more than that – it can be described as a 
“light or a minima High Council of Justice”.281  
With regard to the selection criteria, a major concern is the opacity of the 255 
Committee’s opinions. The evaluation criteria established by the Committee are very general 
and flexible. It is then particularly necessary to know how they are applied, which is 
impossible at the moment. Surely, candidates’ privacy should be respected. However, a 
balance might be found between these two imperatives. In this respect, nothing would 
prevent the 255 Committee to explain in general and anonymous terms how it applies its 
evaluation criteria. 
3. Forces, weaknesses and evolution of the selection procedure of the judges of the 
Court of Justice  
With regard to the observations made above, the selection procedure of the judges of the 
Court of Justice marks a progress in the strengthening of their appearance of independence 
(a). However, this progress is not yet achieved. The selection procedure still suffers from 
some weaknesses (b). As a consequence, it is intended to evolve (c). 
a. Forces of the selection procedure 
The new selection procedure of the judges of the Court of Justice constitutes a real 
progress regarding the previous one in two respects.  
First, the selection of the judges does no longer depend solely on the Member States. It 
does now rely on the opinion provided by an independent Committee composed of highly 
competent and respected members. 
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Before the Lisbon Treaty, the selection procedure relied entirely on mutual confidence 
between Member States
282
. In this context, each of them selected freely its candidate and 
there was no external control of this selection at the European level. In theory, the 
appointment of the candidate was supposed to be made by mutual agreement of all Member 
States. However, in practice, no Member State has ever refused the candidate of another 
Member State.
283
 As a result, in fact, the selection procedure of each judge was only made by 
his Member State.
284
 
The appointment at unanimity by Member States has been maintained in the Lisbon 
Treaty and it still a fiction. Just as no Member State wanted to question the choice of another 
Member State, none of them wants to question the opinion of the 255 Committee. However, 
the novelty of the Lisbon Treaty is that the 255 Committee now exercises an external control 
on the national selections. In this regard, the creation of the Committee allowed it to do what 
Member States did not want to do.  
Second, the intervention of the 255 Committee in the selection procedure strengthens the 
legitimacy of the Court
285
 by providing the guarantee that the selection is supported by some 
objective considerations. In this regard, the 255 Committee has a “moral authority”, which 
has been developed through the delivering of its reports and opinions, that is a real 
“doctrine”, depicting the figure of the “good European judge”.286 As a consequence of this 
moral authority, it is likely that the more the Committee will develop its doctrine, the harder 
it will be for the Member States not to follow its opinions.  
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b. Weaknesses of the selection procedure 
Although the selection procedure established in the Lisbon Treaty constitutes an 
“additional warranty”287 to the appearance of independence of the judges of the Court of 
Justice, it is not sufficient for the next five reasons.  
First, while a control is now exercised on the candidates, Member States still decide 
absolutely freely of their national selection procedure without having to meet real and 
specific requirements. This is all the more striking considering the major importance of the 
national stage in the selection procedure.  
Second, the 255 Committee controls the national selections but not the national selection 
procedures. For instance, a candidate chosen in the detriment of another one for political 
reasons at the national level can receive a favourable opinion from the Committee.  
Third, the Committee only evaluate the suitability of one candidate for the post of judge 
at the Court of Justice. It can neither give an unfavourable opinion to a candidate because he 
is not the best possible, nor evaluate and rank several candidates.  
Four, the Committee’s opinions suffer from an absence of transparency, which does not 
allow the Committee to generate as much confidence as it should and could do.  
Five, the decision of a Member State not tot reappoint a judge totally escapes to the 
competences of the 255 Committee, while it is sometimes due to political reasons.
288
  
c. Evolution of the selection procedure 
Given the weaknesses of the current selection procedure, it is set to evolve. Three main 
changes can be considered. 
First, Members States’ freedom of organization of the selection procedure at the national 
level should be balanced. On the one hand, following the European motto “united in 
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diversity”, their freedom should be maintained. With regard to the selection of a judge for the 
Court of Justice, each Member State has its own views or traditions. Some Member States, 
such as the Netherlands, tend to send Professors to the Court of Justice. Others, such as 
France, rather tend to send judges, while others, such as Denmark, prefer to send high 
functionaries. This diversity reflects internal political and cultural respectable choices. 
However, on the other hand, diversity does not mean that each Member State could do 
anything without having to respect any rule. It does not lead to the absence of procedure. In 
this regard, some common criteria should be established in order to provide a framework for 
the national selection procedures. As a matter of fact, the progressive increase of the 
European Union law knowledge in the Member States will render the establishment of such 
criteria inevitable.
289
 These criteria should be the one that enforce the appearance of 
independence of the judges of the Court of Justice, that is transparency and objectivity of the 
procedure. The 255 Committee would then play the role of the independent body giving its 
opinion for the whole European Union. In particular, it should control the reality of the 
transparency and the objectivity of the national selection procedures. 
Second, the 255 Committee might become able to evaluate and rank several candidates. 
Nothing prevents the Committee to do this. The 255 Committee is inspired from the 
Committee for the Civil Service Tribunal.
290
 By contrast, this latter Committee examine 
candidatures, which are directly sent to it by the candidates.
291
 This is because the Civil 
Service Tribunal is not composed of one judge for each Member State as the Court of Justice 
is. In addition, the Committee for the Civil Service Tribunal has the competence to submit a 
list of the most appropriated candidates to the Member States. This list can include twice as 
much candidate as the number of free positions. In addition, in case of an increase of the 
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number of judges at the Court of Justice (from 27 to 39), all Member States could not be 
equally represented. As a result, it would become necessary to adapt the selection 
procedure.
292
 According to the President of the 255 Committee, the task of the Committee 
might then evolve. It could proceed to a public call for applications and rank candidates 
regarding their merits.
293
 The 255 Committee is ready for this.
294
 As a consequence, if the 
Committee for the Civil Service Tribunal can rank candidates, and if the 255 Committee itself 
could do so in case of an increase of the number of judges at the Court of Justice, then 
nothing in theory prevents the 255 Committee to evaluate and rank several candidates. 
However, in my opinion, this solution should not necessarily be applied if national selection 
procedures were objective and transparent, and if the 255 Committee were controlling them 
in this respect. 
Third, the Committee’s reports should clarify the way the 255 Committee applies its 
evaluation criteria in general and anonyms but understandable and sufficient terms.  
4. Does the selection procedure of the judges of the Court of Justice raise a 
reasonable doubt regarding their appearance of independence? 
I have identified above three situations in which a selection procedure might raise a 
reasonable doubt. I will now try to find out if one of these situations applies to the selection 
of the judges of the Court of Justice. 
First, the selection of a judge by the executive raises a reasonable doubt when its statute 
does not “clearly shows that, once he is appointed, he is not under any pressure, he does not 
receive any instructions from the executive, and he works independently”.295 On the one hand, 
as stated above, the statute of the judges of the Court of Justice is not strong enough to fulfil 
this criterion. On the other hand, it is not obvious that the executive appoints and selects these 
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judges. Surely, Member States proceed to the appointment and some national executives 
proceed alone to the selection of their candidate. However, the 255 Committee plays the role 
of a filter and its opinions are always respected. Even though an important part of the 
selection is made at the national level, the 255 Committee is supposed to address an 
unfavourable opinion to a candidate whose independence is not beyond doubt.   
Second, the selection of a judge who appears to have any interest in the case raises a 
reasonable doubt. The selection of a judge who can appear to be assimilated to a specific 
party does also raise a reasonable doubt, unless his presence constitutes an advantage to 
render justice. A judge cannot be suspected to fall into these categories just because he has 
the nationality of a party at stake. As a result, the statute on the Court of Justice states that “a 
party may not apply for a change in the composition of the Court or of one of its chambers on 
the grounds of either the nationality of a Judge or the absence from the Court or from the 
chamber of a Judge of the nationality of that party”.296 Furthermore, the presence of judges 
from each Member States represents an advantage for the Court of Justice to render justice, 
since it allows the Court to benefit from their in-depth knowledge of their own national law. 
In addition, two considerations should be born in mind, since they largely nuance the 
margin of influence of Member States on the judges at the Court of Justice. 
First, most cases are dealt with chambers composed of three to five judges.
297
 Since 
judges sit in chambers, and since cases are allocated to them by rotational shifts, Member 
States cannot anticipate if their national judge will decide the case at stake.
298
 As a result, 
                                                 
296
 Consolidated version on the statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Art. 17(4). 
297
 “The Court shall sit in a Grand Chamber when a Member State or an institution of the Union that is party to 
the proceedings so requests. The Court shall sit as a full Court where cases are brought before it pursuant to 
Article 228(2), Article 245(2), Article 247 or Article 286(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. Moreover, where it considers that a case before it is of exceptional importance, the Court may decide, 
after hearing the Advocate-General, to refer the case to the full Court.”(Consolidated version on the statute of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, Art. 16(3-5)). See also Malecki, M. (2012), “Do ECJ judges all 
speak with the same voice? Evidence of divergent preferences from the judgments of chambers”, in S. K. 
Schmidt and R. D. Kelemen (eds.), The Power of the European Court of Justice, (Routledge), p. 62-64. 
298
 Malenovski, J. (2011), “L’indépendance des juges internationaux”, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy 
of International Law, vol. 349, p. 90. See also Ritleng, D., op. cit. One could identify two consequences of this 
mechanism. The first is that the nationality of a judge does not affect his right to sit if his Member State is one 
of the parties at stake (Malenovski, ibid.). The second is that some Member States can be judged by a Court in 
which their national judge seats, while others could be judges by a Court in which their national judge is absent. 
Moreover, when a case opposes two Member States, the Court could be composed of a judge of one of these 
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national governments might always try to staff the Court with judges sharing their 
preferences, but they could never be sure that such a strategy will be bearing fruit. 
Second, it is never said whether decisions have been taken at majority or unanimity and 
dissenting opinions are not admitted at the Court of Justice.
299
  As a consequence, Member 
States cannot know how their judge behaved during the deliberate and what role he took in 
the decision.   
In conclusion, it turns out that the selection of the judges of the Court of Justice does not 
really raise a reasonable doubt, so that it would be excessive to consider the Court not to be 
independent because of a lack of appearance of independence. Nevertheless, I have shown 
that this selection procedure raises some doubts, especially because of the political influence 
on the national selection procedure combined with the renewable term of office of the judges 
of the Court of Justice. If these doubts do not break the independence of the judges of the 
Court of Justice, they weaken it. There is then clearly room for strengthening their 
independence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Member States but not the other one. This has been the case, for instance, in the following case: Case C-364/10 
Hungary v. Slovak Republic [2012]. See Ritleng, D., ibid. 
299
 Malenovski, J., op. cit., p. 91. Such protections are necessary, since the threat to a sanction for judges who 
would have adopted positions that their States would not appreciate is real. Examples of such pressures, public 
attacks and call to loyalty can particularly be found in the history of the International Court of Justice (ibidem, p. 
94. See also p. 264-267). There is even statistical evidence that judges at this Court do almost always vote in 
favour of their State. See Smith, A. M. (2005), “‘Judicial Nationalism’ in International Law: National Identity 
and Judicial Autonomy at the ICJ”, Texas International Law Journal, vol. 40, no. 2, p. 197-231. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appearance is perception. Appearance is a matter of confidence. The European Union is 
made of people’s perception. So is the Court of Justice. Accordingly, the public perception of 
the Court should be a primary concern for the European Union. Everything should be done in 
order to reinforce public confidence in the Court of Justice. In this regard, it is necessary to 
ensure that transparent and objective selection procedures of the judges of the Court of 
Justice generate and raise confidence regarding their appearance of independence. Opacity 
and subjectivity are the worst enemies to confidence. As a result, they are serious enemies to 
the European Union and the Court of Justice. Furthermore, an unjustified lack of 
transparency and an inappropriate use of subjectivity are completely incompatible with the 
information society characterised by equality in which we live. 
Five centuries ago, Rabelais created the character of the judge Bridlegoose. In appearance, 
all of his judgments were full of complicated sentences and Latin maxims. In reality, 
Bridlegoose casted the dice to judge complicated cases.
300
 I do not claim that we should go 
back to the Bridlegoose’s system, where apparent formality creates respect regardless of 
reality.
301
 I do not promote the model of judges’ red robes hiding feet of clay.302 I claim that 
the European Union should care more of appearances and organize its institutions, and in 
particular the Court of Justice, in such a way that appearances reinforce and support reality. 
In that sense, one should renounce to build a reality regardless of appearances.  
The European Union looks already forward to increasing the confidence in the judiciary 
within its borders. However, this attention focuses on public confidence in national courts 
and mutual confidence in the judicial European network.
303
 Yet, public confidence in the 
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 Rabelais, F. (1823), La vie de Pantagruel et Gargantua, (Paris: Dalibon), p. 154 and following. The judge 
Bridlegoose said to his judges: “I do like the rest of you, gentlemen, and like the use of justice” (ibidem, p. 160, 
my translation).  
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 Harris, D. H., op. cit., p. 786. 
302
 Miller, A. S., op. cit., p. 74. 
303
 These concerns were at the core of the “Assises de la Justice” hosted by the European Commission on 21-22 
November 2013 in Brussels. As Stated the EU’s Justice Commissioner, V. Reding, “building bridges between 
the different justice systems means building trust. A truly European Area of Justice can only work if there is 
trust in each other's justice systems”. (European Commission (2013), Press Release, Building Trust in Justice 
Systems in Europe: “Assises de la Justice” forum to shape the future of EU Justice Policy). 
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Court of Justice and thus appearance of independence of its judges should constitute a 
primary concern for the European Union.  
The selection procedure of the judges of the Court of Justice weakens without breaking 
their appearance of independence. Can we be content with such a “borderline situation”, or 
should we have greater ambitions for the most powerful Court of the European Union? The 
creation of the 255 Committee is a step forward in the right direction, but it is still not enough. 
Given its current limits, the selection procedure of the judges of the Court of Justice should 
not be seen as achieved, but as still being “under development”. 304  This is only the 
beginning.
305
 Among the different possible evolutions of the 255 Committee, the most likely 
and convincing scenario is for the 255 Committee to become competent in order to control 
not only the candidates submitted by the Member States, but also the national selection 
procedures. 
The way we choose our judges depends on the role we want to see them playing. A strong 
European Union must inspire confidence through its institutions, and in particular the Court 
of Justice. Accordingly, a strong European Union needs a strong Court of Justice.
306
 In this 
view, as Sir David Edward, former judge at the Court of Justice, once put it, “it is highly 
regrettable that more time is not given to thinking how the Court should be structured. This is 
the Cinderella of all intergovernmental conferences”.307 It is now time to dress Cinderella for 
the ball. 
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APPENDIX 
Here are the answers provided by the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Court of the 
United Kingdom and France
308
 to the questionnaire established by the Network of the 
Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the European Union in order to organize its 
colloquium on the Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and to the European Court of Human Rights. 
The questionnaire was about the national selection and appointment procedure of judges 
to the national Supreme Courts, the European Court of Human Rights, and the European 
Court of Justice. I only reproduce the answers covering the selection procedure of the 
candidates to the Court of Justice. 
1. Answers provided by the United Kingdom 
1) What are the qualifications for the candidates (independence and impartiality, 
professional experience, legal training, linguistic abilities, ability to work in an 
international environment)? 
The following is the agreed eligibility criterion for the identification of the UK nominee 
to the ECJ: 
Qualifications necessary for appointment to the ECJ 
In accordance with Article 253 TFEU, judges of the Court of Justice are to be chosen 
from: 
“persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications 
required for the appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries, or 
who are jurisconsults of recognised competence”. 
Selection criteria 
Taking the above qualifications into account, candidates will be expected to demonstrate 
the following qualities, which are essential for this post: 
 Excellent understanding and experience of EU law, including the wider impact of 
the ECJ’s judgments on Member States;  
 Good operational level of French;  
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 Excellent intellectual ability and drafting skills;  
 Experience of legal practice;  
 Good organisational and case management skills, including an ability to 
effectively   delegate to, and work with, a support team at the Court;  
 Excellent interpersonal skills including an ability to communicate effectively and 
  persuasively with colleagues in the Court. 
 
2) How is selection of the candidates conducted on national level? 
In relation to the ECJ, the vacancy was advertised through the websites for the three 
territorial appointments bodies, Judicial Appointments Commission for England & Wales, 
Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland and Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments 
Commission. It was also advertised in the national and regional printed media. 
The vacancy was open to anyone who was able to demonstrate compliance with the 
agreed eligibility criteria. A seven member independent selection panel has been appointed to 
consider the applications received in order to identify the preferred candidate. The preferred 
candidate will have been selected on merit, based upon the selection criteria. 
The selection panel is chaired by the current lay chair of the Judicial Appointments Board 
for Scotland, Sir Muir Russell, with the other members being made up of two members of the 
senior UK judiciary, two senior Government legal advisors and two legal academics. The 
panel will consider all applications before making a recommendation to the Lord Chancellor, 
who in turn will formally advise the Foreign Secretary of the preferred candidate. 
3) What is the transparency of the selection / appointment process? 
The availability of the vacancy has been advertised and disseminated through the existing 
independent appointments organizations. The preferred candidate will have been appointed 
through fair and open competition and will be appointed on merit. 
4) What is and should be the role of the Governments? Should a non-Government 
supported application be taken into consideration? 
The role of the Government is limited within the agreed process to the creation of the 
independent selection panel and agreeing its membership, and then to consider the name of 
the preferred candidate identified by the selection panel as the most meritorious of those who 
applied. 
5) Are the Presidents of the Supreme Courts consulted or otherwise involved? 
All of the Chief Justices of the UK, including the President of the UK Supreme Court, 
have been consulted on the membership of the selection panel and they will be consulted on 
the name of the preferred candidate as and when identified. 
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6) Is the European Courts or their Members involved in the process (officially / 
unofficially)? 
As part of the preparation for the members of the selection panel it has been agreed that 
the existing UK judge to the ECJ, Sir Konrad Schiemann, will provide a background 
presentation on the work of the ECJ in order to assist the selection panel in identifying the 
most meritorious candidate for the post. 
2. Answers provided by France309 
1) What are the qualifications for the candidates (independence and impartiality, 
professional experience, legal training, linguistic abilities, ability to work in an 
international environment)? 
(Question not answered) 
2) How is selection of the candidates conducted on national level? 
The selection of the judges is not formalized in any text, but it rests on a thirty old year 
tradition (twenty for the General Court): 
Traditionally, the position of judge at the Court of Justice is reserved for a State 
Councillor and the position of advocate general for a judge from the judicial order. The 
position of judge at the General Court is alternately granted to a judge of the judicial or 
administrative order since 1989. 
France appoints a candidate for each of these positions. The candidate is auditionned by 
the 255 Committee, which provides a non-binding and not public opinion on its suitability for 
the position at stake. The judge is then appointed by the governements of the Member States 
by common accord.  
3) What is the transparency of the selection / appointment process? 
(Question not answered) 
4) What is and should be the role of the Governments? Should a non-Government 
supported application be taken into consideration? 
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The French Government appoints a candidate for each position (judge at the Court of 
Justice, advocate general at the Court of Justice and judge at the General Court). 
5) Are the Presidents of the Supreme Courts consulted or otherwise involved? 
(Question not answered) 
6) Is the European Courts or their Members involved in the process (officially / 
unofficially)? 
(Question not answered) 
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